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INTELLIGENT DESIGN1 
 
Christopher Buccafusco,2 Mark A. Lemley,3 & Jonathan S. Masur4 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 When designers can obtain exclusive intellectual property (IP) rights 
in the functional aspects of their creations, they can wield these rights to 
increase both the costs to their competitors and the prices that consumers 
must pay for their goods. IP rights and the costs they entail are warranted 
when they serve as needed incentives to encourage designers to invest in 
creating new socially valuable designs. But the law must be wary of 
allowing rights to be misused. Accordingly, IP law has employed a series of 
doctrinal and costly screens to channel designs into the appropriate 
regime—copyright law, design patent law, or utility patent law. 
Unfortunately, those screens are no longer working. Designers are able to 
obtain powerful IP protection over the utilitarian aspects of their creations 
without demonstrating that they have made socially valuable contributions 
and without paying substantial fees that weed out weaker designs. This is 
bad for competition and bad for consumers.  
  In this article, we integrate theories of doctrinal and costly screens, 
and we explore their roles in channeling IP rights. We demonstrate how 
these two types of screens can serve as complements in the efficient 
regulation of design protection, and we illustrate the inefficiencies that have 
arisen through their misapplication in copyright and design patent laws. 
Finally, we propose a variety of solutions that would move design 
protection towards a successful channeling regime, balancing the law’s 
needs for incentives and competition.  Those proposals include improving 
doctrinal screens to weed out functionality, making design protection more 
costly, and preventing designers from obtaining multiple forms of 
protection for the same design. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
                                                
1  © 2017 Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley, & Jonathan S. Masur. 
2  Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, and Director of the Intellectual 
Property + Information Law Program, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University. 
3  William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; partner, Durie Tangri LLP. 
4  John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to Becky 
Eisenberg, Gautam Hans, Mark Janis, Marshall Leaffer, Jessica Litman, Michael Risch, Pam 
Samuelson, Stephen Yelderman, and participants at workshops at Indiana University and the 
University of Michigan for helpful comments and discussions. 
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 Intellectual property (IP) law in the U.S. has two primary regimes 
for protecting the aesthetic or ornamental aspects of product design—
copyright law and design patent law.5  In theory, these separate regimes 
exist to handle different sorts of products, with different sorts of costs and 
benefits arising from IP protection.6 Copyright protection is available for 
any works that are at least trivially original and creative, it arises without 
registration or substantial examination, and it lasts for about a century.7 
Design patent protection, by contrast, is only available for inventions that 
are novel and nonobvious, it requires an application and pre-grant 
examination to commence, and it lasts for only fifteen years.8 Based on 
these differences, any rational designer would clearly prefer copyright 
protection over design patent protection. 
 Traditionally, however, copyright law’s useful articles doctrine has 
prevented many designers from taking advantage of its lower threshold and 
longer duration.9 The useful articles doctrine channeled functional designs 
into the design patent regime rather than the copyright regime.10 Only 
works that had significant, independent aesthetic content—and only that 
aesthetic content—could receive copyright protection. Any aspect of a 
design that was partly functional could not be protected under copyright.11  
 While copyright law typically screened out functional aspects of 
works from protection, design patent law has made it easier to protect 
functional works. Design patent protection is supposed to extend only to the 
ornamental aspects of a work, but design patent law–unlike copyright law–
has traditionally given at least some protection to parts of a work that are 
both ornamental and functional.12 When IP law grants protection to useful 
or functional features of a product rather than merely aesthetic or 
ornamental ones, it can convey substantial market power on those holding 
the right.13 This market power can harm both consumers, who must pay 
higher prices, and subsequent designers and inventors, who must license the 
existing IP or find ways to design around it.14 Accordingly, IP law should 
                                                
5  A third regime – trademark law – is also sometimes used to protect designs. We treat 
trademark law separately in this Article. See infra Part II.C. 
6 By “product design” we refer to a wide variety of products in the fields of applied art and 
industrial design, including consumer electronics, clothing, bicycles, furniture, and automobiles. 
7 See infra notes 80-88. 
8 See infra notes 119-122. 
9 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
10 Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Screening Functionality, VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
11   Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (explaining why functionality can lead to market 
control).  
14 See Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature of 
Sequential Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing and analyzing the 
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carefully channel designers into either design patents or copyrights, 
depending on what they have created. And it should reserve protection for 
functional elements for utility patent law, which has still higher thresholds 
for protection. 
 If IP law allows claimants to gain some protection for functional 
aspects of a design, it should not do so easily or cheaply. It should insist that 
they have contributed something of high value, and it should be circumspect 
about the protection it offers. In this Article, we explain how IP law can and 
should use two separate techniques—doctrinal screens and costly screens—
to make sure that designs are channeled to the appropriate regime and 
receive efficient protection. Doctrinal screens use substantive legal rules the 
exclude certain sorts of claims from a given regime. Different IP regimes’ 
varying creativity thresholds and functionality prohibitions are doctrinal 
screens.  Costly screens, by contrast, channel designs into different regimes 
by altering the costs of obtaining rights.15 The costs of applying for a patent, 
including the fees that an applicant must pay to the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), create costly screens that discourage certain claimants from 
seeking protection. We demonstrate how IP law can effectively use 
doctrinal and costly screens in tandem to optimize design innovation. 
 The system that has been in place for channeling designs between 
copyright, design patent, and utility patent laws should work well if it were 
operating as intended. Copyright law has a low creativity threshold and a 
costless screen, but its high functionality bar should channel utilitarian 
creations to design patent law. There they would meet a high doctrinal 
creativity screen and a costly application screen. The combination of high 
doctrinal and costly screens should minimize the costs of letting the 
inventor control some aspect of functionality by limiting protection to 
designs that are most likely to have high social value and restricting the 
control that such rights give.16 
 Unfortunately, however, the actual operation of IP’s channeling 
techniques is very different. Neither copyright law nor design patent law 
apply the sorts of screens that theory and law require. Consider first 
copyright law after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Star Athletica v. 
Varsity Brands.17 That opinion fundamentally alters copyright law’s 
functionality screen, allowing highly functional products to obtain 
copyrights. As a result, a variety of products that the law had excluded from 
the realm of copyright may now be able to take advantage of its low 
                                                                                                                       
choice between using existing IP or inventing around it); infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
15 Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010); 
David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 681 
(2012) (discussing the social value of costly screens). 
16 We discuss the operation of these screens in detail infra Part I. 
17 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002 (2017). 
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creativity threshold, lack of examination, and long duration to gain 
competitive advantages over functional product features. 
 Things are even worse in design patent law. As we explained above, 
design patent law is intended to impose three limits on its use: a high 
creativity threshold, expensive examination, and short duration. In fact, 
though, none of these features have proved especially significant.18 And 
while design patent duration is relatively short, the difference between it 
and copyright duration will often be insignificant because even fifteen years 
will far exceed the design’s lifecycle.19 Thus, design patent law also isn’t 
doing much of a job of imposing doctrinal or costly screens. 
 Consider, for example, the numerous design patents that cover 
incredibly trivial ornamentation like a triangular marking post,20 
crisscrossed straps on a sports bra,21 or a skull-shaped vodka bottle.22 All of 
these designs cleared the PTO’s novelty and non-obviousness screens and 
have been asserted in litigation against competitors.23 To make matters 
worse, the plaintiffs’ claims won’t be limited to nonfunctional aspects of 
their designs. In Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co. Inc., the plaintiff 
asserted a design patent that covered the shape of a life-jacket flotation 
device with armbands.24 The design, shape, and placement of the armbands 
were determined by the size of human bodies and their ability to keep the 
wearer afloat, making them highly functional.25 That is, for these types of 
flotation devices, function determined form. Nevertheless, in a 2016 
opinion the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the design’s 
functional elements should be construed as part of the claim, along with any 
ornamental elements.26 This substantially broadened the plaintiff’s design 
patent rights to cover the design’s utility. In doing so, the opinion gave the 
plaintiff the ability to block competitors who attempt to market flotation 
devices that perform the function in the same way, even if they have no 
desire to copy the ornamental elements of the flotation devices. This will 
increase costs to other designers and, ultimately, to consumers. 
 In sum, then, the problem is simple, if counterintuitive: it is too 
cheap and too easy to get design protection from various IP regimes, and 
the current rules make that protection too strong.  The operation of these 
laws does an insufficient job of protecting consumers and promoting 
                                                
18 See Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161 (2015) (hereinafter Patented 
Design).  
19 See infra notes 222-223 and accompanying text. 
20 U.S. Patent No. D525,721 (July 25, 2006). 
21 U.S. Patent No. D709,668 (July 29, 2014). 
22 U.S. Patent No. D589,360 (Mar. 31, 2009). 
23 For more examples, see design-law.tumblr.com. 
24 Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
25 Id. at 1322. 
26 Id. at 1322-23. 
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sequential innovation. We offer a series of suggestions to bring design 
protection more in line with social welfare.  First, we might require 
designers to elect either copyright or design patent protection, or at least 
require designers to disclaim any copyright term after design patent 
protection ceases.  That was the rule before 1974, and it would solve many 
of the problems that stem from overlapping protection.27  Second, we could 
weaken the rights that both copyright and design patent now provide so 
there is less incentive to overclaim design rights.  While Star Athletica is a 
large step backwards in this regard, courts still have room to reinvigorate 
the doctrinal screens governing copyright and design patent.  And both the 
PTO and the courts could begin applying an appropriately rigorous 
creativity threshold for design patents. Congress could also step in to 
prevent abuse of design rights, for example by incorporating an independent 
invention defense into design patent law.  Finally, consistent with previous 
work that one of us has done,28 it may be that it is simply too cheap to 
obtain strong design rights.  We suggest that the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) increase application and maintenance fees for design patents 
and use the money for improved examination. 
 Our aim is not to render design protection ineffective.  Others can 
and have disagreed about the importance of IP rights to design.29  Rather, 
our goal is to try to align the private and social value of design rights in IP 
to prevent overclaiming and abuse of those rights.  As the system currently 
stands, that means we need to make design rights weaker, harder to get, or 
both. 
In Part I, we explain why functionality is important to the choice of 
IP regimes.  In Part II, we discuss the theory behind doctrinal and costly 
screens and how Congress attempted to use them to channel designs into the 
appropriate IP regime. When operating properly, these screens could 
provide appropriate incentives to designers while minimizing social costs. 
Unfortunately, as we document in Part III, design screening is not working, 
leaving us with a system that may be the worst of all possible worlds. In 
Part IV, we offer several possible solutions to this problem. 
 
I.  THE CENTRALITY OF FUNCTIONALITY 
 
                                                
27 In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
28 Masur, supra note 15, at 687; Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 692(discussing the social 
value of costly screens). 
29 See Burstein, Patented Design, supra note 18, at 163; Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 
OHIO ST. L.J. 107 (2016) (hereinafter Costly Designs); Mark McKenna & Katherine Strandburg, 
Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2013); Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, 
The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017). 
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IP laws exist to encourage the production of socially valuable 
creations and innovations by granting people certain exclusive rights to the 
works and inventions they produce.30 When authors and inventors obtain 
these rights, they can charge higher prices for the goods that embody their 
works and inventions than they otherwise could.31 These higher prices 
provide an economic incentive to engage in the costly and risky efforts that 
creating and innovating entail.32 
 But IP rights also impose costs of their own. By granting some 
people rights to make certain products, IP laws make purchasing those 
products more expensive for consumers, many of whom will be entirely 
priced out the market.33 In addition, IP rights also can impose substantial 
costs on other creators who want to develop their own works and inventions 
or improve existing ones. They now have to pay license fees or engage in 
costly and risky efforts to design around existing rights.34 For these reasons, 
IP laws—including those that protect design—attempt to balance the 
incentives provided to the current round of creators and the costs imposed 
on consumers and the next round of creators.35 
At the center of this question is whether or to what extent the IP 
right can be used to protect utilitarian or functional aspects in claimed 
works and inventions.36 Society stands to benefit when innovators develop 
                                                
30 Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property and the Promotion of 
Welfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2 (Ben 
Depoorter & Peter Menell, eds., forthcoming 2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2905936. 
31 WILLAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
32   Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[Copyright] is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to 
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws promote 
this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk 
the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby 
fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes 
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better 
lives for our citizens.”). 
33 Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic 
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 282 (2014); Mark A. 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 
(2004). 
34   Id; Buccafusco, Bechtold & Sprigman, supra note 14. 
35 Lemley, supra note 33Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
36 This is not the only reason for the doctrinal differences between the regimes. Scholars have 
asserted numerous rationales to explain, for example, why copyright and patent laws impose different 
creativity thresholds. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 
465, 495 (2004); Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983); 1 PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 (3d ed. 2013); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of 
Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010) (utilizing the psychology of creativity to 
analyze the differences in protectability standards between patent and copyright law). 
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new techniques to build safer buildings or more efficient appliances and to 
better treat diseases.37 But often there are only a limited number of ways to 
design utilitarian products.38 Scientists and engineers have only discovered 
so many ways of safely and effectively treating high blood pressure or 
designing anti-lock brakes. This means that granting inventors exclusive 
control over the utilitarian features of product design can also give them 
substantial market power and enable them to price access to those products 
far above their marginal cost.39 For example, brand name pharmaceuticals 
sell for much higher prices when they are covered by a patent than after 
generic producers have entered the market.40 
 Accordingly, IP law must be careful about granting exclusive rights 
to utilitarian features of products. The utility patent regime is the principal 
home for scientific and technical inventions that improve the ways products 
work.41 But a variety of utility patent law doctrines stringently police access 
to exclusive rights. An inventor seeking a utility patent must prove that her 
invention is “novel”42 and “nonobvious”43—not only that she is the first to 
create it, but also that it is more than the predictable combination of pre-
existing elements. The inventor must also demonstrate that the invention is 
useful and describe how it should be used.44 Moreover, all of this must be 
proved to the satisfaction of an examiner at the Patent and Trademark 
Office before a utility patent is issued. 
Given these high demands on functional inventions, some 
innovators attempt to skirt the rigors of utility patent law by seeking 
                                                
37 See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 33. 
38 One example is the pocket multi-tool described by U.S. Design Patent 707,091. The device 
comprises several tools built into one small structure, including a bottle opener, screwdriver, 
smartphone kickstand, set of hex wrenches, and so forth. The device is only able to perform these 
functions because of its shape and design, and thus design and function are inextricably linked. 
Nonetheless, the PTO allowed a patent on the device, which the owner asserted. See, e.g., Caffeinate 
Labs, Inc. v. Vante, Inc., 2017 WL 2889031, at 2 (D. Mass. 2017).  
39 We do not suggest that exclusive rights covering aesthetic or ornamental aspects of product 
design could never convey market power. If they did not provide at least some ability to price 
products above marginal cost, copyrights and design patents would have no meaningful incentive 
effects. We merely claim that, given a certain scope for IP rights, those covering functional or 
utilitarian aspects of design are likely to convey more market power because of the limited range of 
competitive options.  
40 Rena M. Conti & Ernst R. Berndt, Specialty Drug Prices and Utilization after Loss of U.S. 
Patent Exclusivity, 2001-2007, in MEASURING AND MODELING HEALTH CARE COSTS (Ana Aizcorbe et 
al., eds.) available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13100. 
41 Mark M. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s 
Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017). 
42 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
43 35 U.S. C. § 103 ([A patent] may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which the claimed invention pertains.”). 
44 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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protection through either the copyright or design patent regimes. Doing so 
would provide a mechanism for them to obtain “backdoor utility patents.”45 
I might not be able to patent the wheel; I’m not the first inventor.  But if I 
can get a copyright in my round design I might effectively get some of the 
same control over the wheel without having to clear the novelty and 
nonobviousness hurdles.  Thus, the copyright and design patent regimes 
must themselves police creators’ attempts to gain IP protection for 
functional features of their products without spending the time and money 
and meeting the higher standards of utility patent law. As we explain below, 
IP law serves to channel different sorts of creations into the appropriate 
doctrinal home based on their degree of functionality. Depending on a 
product’s functionality, it is eligible for copyright, design patent, or utility 
patent protection. Each of these doctrines imposes different sorts of hurdles, 
treats functional features in different ways, and creates different sorts of 
rights.46 
As applied to design law, the differences between these IP 
regimes—and the screens that separate them—are driven largely by the 
extent to which they can be used to protect functional inventive elements.  
The critical question is whether and to what extent the IP regime can be 
used to claim exclusive rights over a utilitarian invention that performs 
some function rather than merely the designs or ornamentations that are 
layered over or intertwined with that invention.  There are many other 
differences between these IP regimes, including the damages that plaintiffs 
can obtain and the defenses available to accused infringers, and we will 
discuss a variety of these distinctions.  But our focus is on functionality, 
because it is through the protection of function that a creator can turn a 
design right into a powerful market position. 
Ideally, utility patent, design patent, and copyright laws work 
together to appropriately channel different kinds of creations into the 
correct legal regime—the one that maximizes the law’s benefits net of 
costs. In the next section we explain the tools the law uses to perform this 
channeling. 
 
II.  SCREENS AT THE INTERSECTION OF COPYRIGHT 
AND DESIGN PATENT 
 
                                                
45 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10; Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor 
Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473 
(2004). 
46   Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10; Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the 
Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2908496; McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 
41; Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611 (2014). 
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Before the government awards a valid design right to a private party, 
it must have some way of determining that doing so will further the goals of 
the IP system.  One way to do this is to limit protection to designs that meet 
certain doctrinal thresholds.47 A court, and sometimes also the PTO, 
scrutinizes the design to determine whether it warrants protection under the 
relevant IP doctrines.  But doctrine is only one tool for screening out 
designs that do not deserve protection.  In addition, the government uses 
costly screens—fees and other expenses that someone seeking an IP right 
must pay—as a means of screening out rights that would do more social 
harm than good.48 
 These two approaches can be complementary and are frequently 
applied in tandem.  Indeed, doctrinal screens often serve as a driver of 
costly screens.  The higher the doctrinal threshold that a party must pass in 
order to claim a right, the more that party will have to spend—in attorney’s 
fees and other costs—in perfecting and obtaining the right.  And the more 
expensive it is to obtain the right, the more important it must be to make it 
worth the trouble of trying to obtain it.  The laws establishing utility patents, 
design patents, and copyrights, and delineating the boundaries between the 
three, all balance costs and benefits. Importantly, however, each of these 
fields attempts to strike this sort of balance in different ways.  They differ in 
terms of how easily rights are granted, and with respect to the scope and 
duration of the rights that people receive.  Accordingly, the screens that 
separate the three fields, and that separate protectable from unprotectable 
creations within each field, are different as well.49 
In the sections that follow, we describe the operation of these 
screens and the ways in which they do or do not achieve optimal policy 
objectives.  First, however, we begin by describing the operation of screens 
in general and the manner in which they are designed to function. 
 
A. The Theory Behind Doctrinal and Costly Screens 
  
As we described in Part I, IP protection involves tradeoffs between 
social benefits and costs. The goal of the IP system is to grant rights only 
when doing so will produce net social benefits.50  In addition, the strength 
of the IP right determines both the incentive it creates to produce further 
creativity and also the costs it imposes on third parties.  The stronger the 
                                                
47 See Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon 
Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
1921 (2014). 
48   Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 684; Masur, supra note 15, at 693. 
49   Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10. 
50 See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 33 (explaining the policy aims behind a coherent system 
of IP rules). 
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right, the greater the incentives it creates, but also the greater the costs it 
imposes.  Given a menu of different IP rights, the legal system should grant 
the appropriate right to maximize net social benefits relative to other kinds 
of rights.51 Screens affect these tradeoffs by ensuring that not every right is 
granted to every party that seeks it and that the parties who do get rights get 
the appropriate ones, not ones that are too strong or too weak. 
 Accordingly, one naïve theory of screens would hold that stronger 
IP rights should be accompanied by higher and costlier screens.52  Before a 
party can obtain a more valuable right, it should be forced to pass a more 
rigorous test, satisfy a higher legal standard, pay higher costs, and so forth.  
This approach is facially plausible and perhaps intuitively appealing, but it 
is also wrong.  The reason is that the objective of a screen is not merely to 
block the strongest or most powerful IP rights.  After all, some of these 
rights are also the most socially valuable, in that they have encouraged the 
most beneficial research.53  In some cases, strong rights may be necessary to 
provide powerful incentives to create.  Rather, the objective of a screen is to 
separate those rights that are net socially valuable from those that are net 
socially harmful, allowing the former and blocking the latter.54  Moreover, 
in the case of designs, where creators have multiple options for obtaining 
IP, the objective behind these screens is to channel creators into selecting 
the type of IP protection that will generate the greatest social benefits net of 
costs.55 
 As noted above, we can limit access to IP rights in two fundamental 
ways – by imposing doctrinal barriers a creator must clear or by raising the 
cost of obtaining a right.  We call the former approach “doctrinal screens” 
and the latter “costly screens.” Doctrinal screens and costly screens operate 
in slightly different ways.  A doctrinal screen acts as a firm bar against 
certain types of design rights.  If the design does not satisfy the necessary 
doctrinal conditions, it does not qualify for protection.  A properly 
calibrated doctrinal screen will refuse protection to designs when the social 
costs of granting a design right outweigh the benefits. Consider, for 
example, a creativity threshold for IP rights. By imposing such a threshold, 
the law judges that designs that cannot meet some standard of cleverness or 
novelty are unlikely to generate sufficient social benefits to justify the costs 
associated with IP protection.56  This is a type of doctrinal screen.  Costly 
                                                
51 Id. 
52 See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 704 (describing and rejecting this theory). 
53 Id. at 713. 
54 Id. at 692. 
55 Cf. MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 32 
(2006) (describing the object of social planners as maximizing benefits net of costs). 
56 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1578 
(2003) (explaining patent law’s utilitarian framework and the ways in which IP laws are calibrated to 
generate net social benefits). 
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screens, on the other hand, force applicants to choose whether or not to 
pursue a certain type of design right.57 That is, whether a not an applicant 
could qualify for a right doctrinally, she must determine whether or not the 
costs of obtaining and keeping the right are worth it to her.58  
 
B. Private Value, Social Value, and Screens 
  
The law’s goal in applying either sort of screen is to align private 
incentives with social value. We can think of design rights as falling into 
one of four categories based on the relationship between private and social 
value.59  First, consider the private value of the right—the value of the right 
to its owner.  IP rights can have “low” private value, meaning that putative 
owners will not be able to generate significant income from the ownership 
of the right. Or they can have “high” private value, meaning that putative 
owners will be able to generate significant income from the ownership of 
the right. This income could arise through making products covered by the 
right, licensing the right to others, or litigation over the right.   
Second, consider the social value of the right—whether the right 
produces net costs or net benefits for society.  IP rights can have positive 
social value or negative social value.  Thus, there are four categories of 
rights: high private value/positive social value rights; high private 
value/negative social value rights; low private value/positive social value 
rights; and low private value/negative social value rights. 
 
TABLE 1: FOUR POSSIBLE TYPES OF IP RIGHTS 
 Social value 
Pr
iv
at
e 
va
lu
e 
1. High private 
value/Positive social 
value 
2. High private 
value/Negative social 
value 
3. Low private 
value/Positive social 
value 
4. Low private 
value/Negative social 
value 
 
Doctrinal screens are meant to separate rights based upon social 
value. They should prohibit the creation of IP rights that are predicted to 
                                                
57 Masur, supra note 15, at 688. 
58 Id. at 688-90. 
59 This two-by-two categorization was initially laid out in Masur, supra note 15, and Fagundes 
& Masur, supra note 15.  In those earlier works, the authors referred to “low social value” and “high 
social value” rights.  Here, for greater clarity, we describe them as “negative social value” and 
“positive social value” rights.  The categorization is identical; only the nomenclature has changed 
slightly. 
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have negative net social value. That is, a well-calibrated doctrinal screen is 
meant to draw a vertical line between the positive social value rights in 
boxes 1 and 3 from the negative social value rights in boxes 2 and 4, 
permitting the former and blocking the latter.  
 
 
TABLE 2: IDEALIZED DOCTRINAL SCREEN 
 Social value 
Pr
iv
at
e 
va
lu
e 
1. High private 
value/Positive social 
value 
2. High private 
value/Negative social 
value 
3. Low private 
value/Positive social 
value 
4. Low private 
value/Negative social 
value 
 
Consider, for instance, the requirement that utility and design 
patents must be new and nonobvious. The purpose of patents is to create 
incentives for new and valuable innovation. Absent new innovation, patents 
are unlikely to create positive social value. Accordingly, the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements are meant to screen out those patent 
applications that did not involve any socially valuable innovation and—if 
they were granted—would be likely to do net social harm.60 Other doctrinal 
tests, such as the utility requirement for utility patents and the 
idea/expression distinction in copyright law, perform similar functions. 
Of course, even well-calibrated doctrinal screens will not function 
perfectly. Requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness are only 
proxies for positive social value. For instance, imagine a design patent 
application involving a new and nonobvious design, but one that the 
designer would have created whether or not she was able to obtain a 
patent.61 A patent on this design would create negative social value, because 
(a) the valuable design would exist regardless, and (b) the patent will 
increase costs for consumers and subsequent designers. Merely satisfying 
doctrinal IP requirements does not guarantee that the IP right will 
necessarily create social value. And of course not all doctrines are properly 
calibrated, nor are they always properly applied. The doctrine might be too 
lax or too stringent, and courts or the PTO may err when evaluating whether 
a given right satisfies the doctrinal requirements. Thus, no IP doctrine 
                                                
60 See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
61 See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 
YALE L.J. 1590 (2011). 
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actually succeeds in drawing a perfect vertical line down the center of Table 
1. Any system of doctrine will inevitably permit some negative social value 
rights to see the light of day and block some positive social value rights. 
Accordingly, even if doctrinal screens are well-calibrated—and certainly if 
they are not—there is a potential role for some other type of screen to play. 
 
TABLE 3: REALISTIC DOCTRINAL SCREEN 
 Social value 
Pr
iv
at
e 
va
lu
e 
1. High private 
value/Positive social 
value 
2. High private 
value/Negative social 
value 
3. Low private 
value/Positive social 
value 
4. Low private 
value/Negative social 
value 
 
Enter the possibility of costly screens. A costly screen is simply a 
requirement that an applicant expend some amount of money to obtain, 
maintain, or enforce a given legal right. The costly screen can take the form 
of an application fee, a maintenance fee, or a fee that must be paid for 
litigating a given right. Costly screens may also arise because compliance 
with some aspect of the law is expensive, such as the need to hire a lawyer 
to prosecute a patent. Because it is the IP applicant or owner who must bear 
the expense, costly screens affect IP rights differentially based upon their 
private value. That is, a costly screen draws a horizontal line between the 
high private value rights in boxes 1 and 2 and the low private value rights in 
boxes 3 and 4. For high private value rights, costly screens are irrelevant.  If 
the rights are highly valuable to their potential owner, the owner will invest 
the money to obtain them regardless of the cost.62 The screen will only 
serve to run up the costs of such owners. 
 
TABLE 4: IDEALIZED COSTLY SCREEN 
 Social value 
Pr
iv
at
e 
va
lu
e 
1. High private 
value/Positive social 
value 
2. High private 
value/Negative social 
value 
3. Low private 
value/Positive social 
value 
4. Low private 
value/Negative social 
value 
                                                
62 Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 692. 
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Thus, costly screens are a second-best solution because they will not 
eliminate IP rights that fall into box 2, namely rights that have high private 
value (so creators will pay to obtain them) but negative social value. For 
example, if someone could claim the exclusive right to publish stories about 
star-crossed lovers she would be able to obtain substantial private value 
from doing so, but that would clearly make society worse off. No costly 
screen would prevent a creator from applying for a copyright or patent on 
such a valuable idea. A doctrinal screen is necessary. For this reason, 
copyright law’s idea/expression doctrine prevents people from obtaining 
such rights.63 No matter how much people would be willing to pay to obtain 
a copyright over an idea or a utility patent over a product of nature, 
doctrinal screens prevent them from doing so.64 
 
TABLE 5: DOCTRINAL AND COSTLY SCREENS IN COMBINATION 
 Social value 
Pr
iv
at
e 
va
lu
e 
1. High private 
value/Positive social 
value 
2. High private 
value/Negative social 
value 
3. Low private 
value/Positive social 
value 
4. Low private 
value/Negative social 
value 
 
Instead, the function of a costly screen is to eliminate or curtail the 
number of low private value IP rights.  If the costly screen exceeds the 
value of the right to its putative owner, the owner will not seek (or maintain, 
or enforce) the IP right. Of course, the private value of the right is not what 
policymakers really care about—their focus is the social value of the right.65  
Costly screens will reduce the number of low private value/negative social 
value rights—box 4—which is good, but they will also reduce the number 
of low private value/positive social value rights—box 3—which is bad.66  
Accordingly, costly screens are appropriate when the number of potential 
low private value/negative social value rights is high and the number of 
potential low private value/positive social value rights is low, and they are 
                                                
63 17 U.S.C. 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
64 See 35 U.S.C. § 101; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980); Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
65 Id. at 695-97. 
66 Id. at 695-98. 
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counterproductive when the reverse is true.67 On the other hand, costly 
screens are ill-advised in cases where policymakers believe that there are 
likely to be few low private value/negative social value rights (box 4) but 
many low private value/high social value rights (box 3). Here, a costly 
screen would do more harm than good by eliminating too many rights that 
produce net social value.  
Doctrinal screens and costly screens are complements, not 
substitutes.  They can and do exist side-by-side in a wide variety of legal 
regimes.68  At the boundary between copyrights, design patents, and utility 
patents, doctrinal screens and costly screens play important supplementary 
roles.  Doctrinal screens sort designs between the copyright, design patent, 
and utility patent regimes, determining which will qualify for each category.  
And then within those three doctrinal regimes, costly screens (or their 
absence) determine the types of rights that creators will seek to obtain.  For 
the system to function properly, the two types of screens must be well-
calibrated to perform these operations in tandem. 
 
C. Doctrinal Screens and the Selection of IP Regimes 
  
Now that we have laid out the principles behind doctrinal and costly 
screens, we turn our attention to the IP doctrines through which these 
screens are meant to operate.  
 Because our focus is functionality, our baseline is the utility patent 
regime.  Utility patents were designed to protect functional inventions, and 
indeed they can only be used to protect functional inventions.69  Before an 
inventor can obtain a utility patent, however, she must surmount a series of 
doctrinal and costly screens that are implemented (directly or indirectly) 
through examination by the PTO.  The inventor must demonstrate to the 
PTO that her invention is within the realm of utility patent law,70 is new and 
nonobvious,71 is sufficiently developed and disclosed,72 and that it has 
useful applications.73 In addition, as one of us has written, the high cost of 
obtaining a utility patent functions as a costly screen that eliminates a 
significant number of low private value rights.74  The PTO’s examination of 
                                                
67 Id. at 703-07 (describing the general point in the context of copyright and patent law). 
68 Doctrinal screens can also create costly screens. For example, trade dress law’s requirement 
that a claimant must establish that the design has secondary meaning as a designation of source will 
typically involve the expenditure of substantial resources on advertising. See infra note XX. 
69 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017). 
70 35 U.S.C. § 101 (patentable subject matter). 
71 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novel); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (nonobvious). 
72 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that the invention be described and enabled). 
73 Id. 
74 Masur, supra note 15, at 701. 
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patents is not always rigorous or effective, and the costly screen imposed is 
not terribly high when compared with the most valuable patents.75  
Nonetheless, utility patent law couples the IP regime that is most protective 
of functionality with the most stringent doctrinal and costly barriers to 
entry.  In the sections that follow, we compare copyright law and design 
patent law against this baseline.  We explore the extent to which they can be 
used to obtain “backdoor” protection for functional elements and the legal 
responses to the possibility of such protection. 
 Our primary focus is on utility patents, design patents, and 
copyrights, not on trademark law. Although each of these fields falls under 
the rubric of intellectual property protection, their foundations differ in 
important ways. Congress’s power to grant copyrights and patents is 
grounded in the progress clause of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.76 
Copyrights and patents are intended to stimulate creativity and innovation. 
In the context of product designs, this means that Congress should use its 
power to grant copyrights and patents over product designs to optimize 
innovation in the field.  
 Trademark law is—or at least is supposed to be—different. 
Congress’s power to establish and protect trademarks comes from the 
commerce clause of the Constitution,77 and that power is exercised, not 
primarily to incent producers, but rather to protect consumers from 
confusion in the market.78 Trademarks, which can include the design of 
product or its trade dress, prevent consumers from being misled about, for 
                                                
75 See id.; Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1508-11 (2001); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 130-33 (2004); 
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 
1567 (2006) (“Fee diversion has impoverished the PTO, making it difficult for the Office to search or 
examine prior art comprehensively.”); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s 
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53 (2007); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the 
Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
2051, 2062-63 (2009); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67 
(2013) (arguing that the PTO grants too many patents in order to earn maintenance fees). 
76 Art I, s. 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . To promote the progress of science and 
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings 
and discoveries.” 
77 Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power…To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
78 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 31, at 167–68; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004); Nicholas S. 
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525–27 (1988) (discussing 
the economic benefits of marks that apprise consumers of products' unobservable features); Nicholas 
S. Economides, Trademarks, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 602 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing the savings for consumers in product searches as one of “[t]he 
primary reasons for the existence and protection of trademarks”). Cf. Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007) (arguing that 
trademark law before the 20th century was based on unfair competition rather than consumer 
protection, but noting that they are both serving similar goals in protecting a functioning market). 
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example, whether a particular shoe is made by Converse or not.79 To the 
extent that Congress allows designers to claim exclusive rights to product 
designs via trade dress law it is not doing so to promote innovative designs. 
But because trade dress does, in fact, affect innovation in design, we 
address its interactions with copyright and patent law in Part II.  
 
1.  Copyright Law 
 
 On its face, copyright law would appear to be the most favorable 
place for creators to turn in search of backdoor utility patents, because 
copyright law imposes the lowest creativity threshold for protection, and, 
once granted, copyright protection lasts the longest. To prevent this sort of 
doctrinal arbitrage, copyright has imposed the strictest set of functionality 
screens, traditionally limiting its availability only to works with no, or very 
modest amounts of, functionality.  
 Obtaining a copyright is incredibly easy. Federal copyright 
protection exists from the moment that a works is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.80 Creators need not demonstrate any substantial 
cleverness to obtain copyright protection.81 A work is protectable if it is 
original, which means that it was not copied from another source and that it 
evinces some more than entirely trivial degree of creativity.82 So while the 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected a copyright claim for a telephone book white 
pages directory because it was insufficiently original and creative,83 courts 
have upheld protection for yellow pages directories,84 fairly simple 
photographs,85 and three-note sequences of music.86 Copyright law sets the 
creativity hurdle incredibly low, enabling virtually any work with a spark of 
cleverness or novelty to sail over.87  
 Copyright law is also cheap.  Authors don’t need to pay any money 
or file any paperwork to obtain copyright protection.88  Every reader of this 
                                                
79 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763. 
80 Christopher Jon Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 485 (2004). 
81 Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
82 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression…”). 
83 Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
84   See Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2nd 
Cir. 1991).  
85 See Schrock v. Learning Curve Intern., Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Mannion v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 225 F.3d 
1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 
86   See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2014) (assuming without deciding 
that a three-note sequence of a musical composition could have evinced sufficient originality to be 
copyrightable). 
87 Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 464, 488–89 (2009); 
Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer & Sprigman, supra note 47. 
88 17 U.S.C. § 408 (noting that “registration is not a condition of copyright protection”). 
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article has created at least one and probably several copyrights today, just 
by living an ordinary life.  Creators need not register their works with the 
Copyright Office, although they may do so for a nominal fee,89 and the 
Office will generally grant registration without meaningful examination of 
the claimed work.90 If they do want the additional benefits of copyright 
registration, creators can pay $40 and fill out a very simple form online,91 
no lawyers or bankers required.  For this nominal sum, they get quite a bit.  
Copyright protection isn’t just easy to obtain; it also lasts for a really long 
time.92 Most copyrights last for about a century or more.93 
 Copyright law offers creators a regime without meaningful 
examination, a trivial creativity bar, and incredibly long protection. Creators 
who cannot meet utility patent law’s strict utility and nonobviousness 
requirements or who desire longer protection are often tempted to seek 
copyright protection instead. To combat this behavior, Congress created 
strict functionality screens that would prevent misuse.94 In some cases, 
copyright law simply denies protection to entire categories of works 
because they are deemed too functional.95 However expressive cooking or 
yoga might be, creators cannot rely on copyright law for protection in these 
fields.96 In other cases, such as computer software, copyright law allows 
limited protection for the relatively few expressive aspects of such works 
while also filtering out any of their functional content from protection.97 
                                                
89 Id. § 408 (“At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published 
or unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and during the 
subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive 
right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office 
the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 
409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.”). 
90 See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Judicial Review of Copyright Examination, 44 IDEA 479 (2004). 
91 See https://www.copyright.gov/registration/. 
92 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
93 Id. For many works, copyrights lasts for the life of the author plus an additional seventy years 
postmortem. Id. For other works, including works made for hire or works created before 1978, 
copyright typically lasts for 95 years from the date of first publication. Id. 
94 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10; Samuelson, supra note 46. 
95 Buccafusco and Lemley refer to this as an “Exclusion Screen.” Buccafusco & Lemley, supra 
note 10. 
96   Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996); Lorenzana v. South 
American Rest. Corp., 799 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2015) (denying copyright protection to chicken 
sandwich); Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 
2015) (denying copyright protection to a series of yoga poses). See also Christopher Buccafusco, 
Authorship and the Boundaries of Copyright: Ideas, Expressions, and Functions in Yoga, 
Choreography, and Other Works, 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 421 (2016); Christopher Buccafusco, On the 
Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1107 (2007); Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual 
Property Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2012). 
97   Computer Associates International v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). See also, Pamela 
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests of Software 
Copyright Infringement (UC Berkeley Public Law, Working Paper No. 2667740, 2015, 
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Copyright protection, if it exists for a computer program, should not cover 
any of its aspects that relate to efficiency or compatibility, leaving those 
free for others to copy and use.98  
 Most important for design, however, is the regime that Congress 
created for handling pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. Congress was 
concerned that industrial designers would attempt to use copyright law to 
gain exclusive rights over the designs of “useful articles” such as clothing, 
furniture, or appliances.99 Because these items are intrinsically functional, 
easily obtainable exclusive rights could create substantial and unwarranted 
costs for the public and on subsequent creators.100 To avert this risk, the 
Copyright Act imposes additional eligibility criteria on useful articles.101 
Such works are copyrightable only if and only to the extent that they 
contain “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.”102  
 The useful articles doctrine was intended to exclude from copyright 
law works of industrial design, including the creativity and innovation 
associated with successfully marrying form and function.103 The artistic yet 
simultaneously functional design of a chair leg, automobile hood, 
smartphone, or garment were unprotectable via copyright.104 Protection 
could extend only to purely non-functional features of useful articles such 
as a hood ornament or printed decal. That is, copyright would only attach to 
features of a work that existed solely to portray its appearance or convey 
information.105 
For example, the Second Circuit denied the designer of the “Ribbon 
Rack” bicycle rack copyright protection even though the work was 
aesthetically appealing and had won numerous design awards.106 The 
aspects of the design that were expressive, such as the shape of its curves, 
were also intrinsically related to its functionality. By contrast, the same 
                                                                                                                       
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2667740); Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API 
Copyright Dead: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features 
of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017). 
98 See, e.g., Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); but see Oracle 
America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
99 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is 
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”). 
100 See Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
101 Id. 
102   17 U.S.C. § 101. 
103 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 49-50, 54-55, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5662-63, 5667-68. 
104 Id.  
105 17 U.S.C. s 101 (defining “useful article”). See Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note XX. 
106 Brandir v. Cascade Int’l, 834 F.2d 1142 (2nd Cir. 1987) (considering the functionality of an 
artistic bicycle rack). 
20 DESIGN PROTECTION [3-Nov-17 
court upheld copyrights in decorative belt buckles, because the buckles’ 
shape did not affect their utility and was entirely superimposed on the 
functional aspects of the designs.107 Thus, copyright law’s useful articles 
doctrine allowed creators to obtain protection for solely non-functional 
aspects of their designs, but it rejected claims based on design elements that 
intermixed functional and non-functional components.108 
 Beyond the useful articles doctrine, copyright law also includes a 
variety of other features meant to balance its power and scope.  On one 
hand, copyright law offers reasonably broad protection against competition. 
Copyright owners can prevent not only literal or exact duplications of their 
designs but also those that are substantially similar to them.109 This can 
include works that have the same “aesthetic appeal” as the copyrighted 
work.110 On the other hand, copyright law limits this otherwise broad scope 
in a number of ways. First, copyright only prohibits actual copying: a 
designer sued for infringement can defend herself by proving that she 
independently created the allegedly infringing design, even if the prior and 
subsequent designs are identical.111 Second, copyright law narrows the 
scope of an author’s copyright only to her expression of a particular idea, 
rather than to the idea itself. For example, the designer of a jeweled pin the 
shape of a bee cannot prevent everyone else from producing bee-shaped 
jewelry.112 Third, copyright law’s fair use doctrine permits certain kinds of 
copying that are deemed socially valuable or that don’t interfere with the 
copyright owner’s market exploitation.113 Although comment and criticism 
are the paradigmatic examples of fair use, it can also include instances of 
copying that are motivated by the need to access functional features of a 
work.114 Finally, copyright law limits the damages that a victorious 
infringer can receive.  Copyright apportions damages for infringing and 
                                                
107 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
108   That law has recently changed in significant respects as a result of the Supreme Court’s Star 
Athletica decision.  We discuss that decision in Part II. 
109 See e.g. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2nd Cir. 2001).  
110 Id. But see Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting plaintiff’s copyright 
in jellyfish-in-glass sculpture to “thin protection” against only virtually identical copying). 
111 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1936) (“just as he is no 
less an ‘author’ because others have preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tort-feasor 
unless he pirates his work”). On the independent creation doctrine in copyright law see ABRAHAM 
DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015). 
112 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.”).  For a discussion of the market effect of fair use, see Jeanne Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, 
The Audience in IP Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014). 
114 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer 
Entertainment v. Connectix Corporation, 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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non-infringing elements.115 That is, even if a design is held to infringe an 
existing copyright, the copyright owner can only recover damages based on 
the proportion of lost royalties attributable to the copying.116  She cannot 
recover royalties attributable to other, non-copyrighted elements of the 
infringing product.117 
Thus, at least since the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright law has 
coupled an incredibly low creativity screen, a low cost of acquisition, and a 
long term of protection with a rather robust functionality screen and a 
number of doctrines that limit the right’s power. Although purely non-
functional works could obtain protection with ease, functional works would 
be excluded from the regime. In particular, creators of industrial designs 
would be channeled into the design patent or utility patent regimes to seek 
protection. 
 
 2.  Design Patents 
 
 For creators seeking IP protection over ornamental designs, design 
patent law offers the primary alternative to copyright.118 Design patents 
protect the ornamental features of a utilitarian article of manufacture.119 
While design patent law’s ornamentality requirement has been treated as a 
functionality bar, it has been applied in a far more relaxed manner than 
copyright law’s useful articles doctrine.  Thus, by contrast to copyright law, 
where functionality is supposed to be rigorously policed, design patent 
doctrine is more tolerant of claims that mix ornamentality with utility.120 
Design elements will be eligible for protection whenever there are other 
alternatives to the claimed element.121 Because there is often at least one 
other way of achieving a function—even if it isn’t quite as good of a way—
design patents will often include substantial functionality that is mixed with 
ornamentality.     
                                                
115 Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989); Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
116 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
117 Sheldon v. MGM, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). This does not mean that copyright’s damages 
provisions are a model of policymaking. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009).  
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118 Congress has considered a number of other design protection regimes in the last hundred 
years. See Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 
37 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 339 (1990). Congress has even adopted a separate design protection 
regime for vessel hulls. 17 U.S.C. s. 1301. 
119 17 U.S.C. § 171 (design is “for a [utilitarian] article of manufacture”). 
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121 Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 261, 281–85 (2012).   
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Both the Patent and Trademark Office—which oversees design patent 
law—and the federal courts have enabled creators to include within the 
scope of their patents aspects of designs that are not purely non-functional. 
Claimants have been allowed to protect design features that do more than 
merely portray appearances or convey information and that, instead, 
contribute to how the design works and are valued in substantial part on 
their utility. So although design patent claims should be “construed in order 
to identify the non-functional aspects of the design,”122 what counts as 
“non-functional” in the design patent context is broader than it has been in 
copyright law.  
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has consistently 
accommodated design patents that cover aspects of designs that contribute 
to a product’s usefulness or efficiency. Consider, for example, the shoe 
design at issue in L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co. Although each 
element of the plaintiff’s shoe design contributed to the shoe’s function, the 
court upheld the plaintiff’s design patent because the overall design of the 
shoe was not “dictated by the use or purpose of the article.”123 Although 
these elements served a utilitarian purpose, they were still protectable 
because competitors could achieve the same purpose with different 
designs.124 Thus, even though the design elements served a utilitarian 
function and even though they may have been the best way to achieve that 
function, they were still included within the scope of the plaintiff’s claim.125 
In what is perhaps the Federal Circuit’s most comprehensive discussion 
of functionality screening, the court in Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc. 
explained that design patents would only be declared invalid if “ the 
patented design is primarily functional rather than ornamental.”126 Thus, 
many designs that were substantially functional but not primarily so would 
be upheld. Even so, the court “factored out” functional elements of a multi-
function tool design from the scope of the plaintiff’s claim when it came to 
deciding infringement. These elements included the handle, the hammer-
head, and the jaw, because they were “driven purely by utility.”127 The 
plaintiff still had a valid patent covering the “ornamental” design of the 
tool, which in this case included the shape of the tool’s edges and 
                                                
122  OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
123 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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125 See Perry J. Saidman, Functionality and Design Patent Validity and Infringement, 91 J. Pat. 
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functional features of an article of manufacture claimed in a design patent were removed from 
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126 597 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
127 Id. at 1294. 
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corners.128 But whatever “ornamental” means here, it certainly doesn’t 
mean entirely non-functional. The shape of a hand tool’s corners and edges 
will contribute significantly to its comfort, manipulability, and wearability. 
These are aspects of the design that copyright law’s useful article doctrine 
would traditionally have screened out because they are simultaneously 
aesthetic and functional.  
In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Corp., the Federal Circuit upheld 
the validity and infringement of the rounded corners of the iPhone design, 
even while acknowledging that they improved “pocketability” and 
“durability.”129 This decision is even more startling in light of that the fact 
that, earlier in the same opinion, the court rejected Apple’s claim to trade 
dress on the same features on the grounds that they were functional.130 By 
including functional features, the court noted, Apple “pursued both ‘beauty’ 
and functionality.131 Nonetheless, Apple could still draw upon design 
patents for IP protection. While copyright (at least until recently) excluded 
an item from protection if there was no way to separate its non-functional 
and functional aspects, design patent law welcomes designs that intertwine 
form and function. The only designs or elements that will be excluded from 
design patent’s functionality screen are those that are purely utilitarian.132 
 Design patents differ from copyrights in a number of other 
dimensions that affect their scope and strength. For example, most scholars 
think that design patents have a narrower scope than copyrights.133 
Variations from a design that copyright law would treat as substantially 
similar and thus infringing, design patent law would treat as sufficiently 
different and noninfringing.134 In other ways, however, design patents are 
more powerful rights than copyrights.  There is no independent invention 
defense to design patents: if a subsequent design infringes an existing 
design patent, it is irrelevant whether or not the designer copied the pre-
existing design.135 Furthermore, design patent law does not include any 
defense akin to copyright law’s fair use provision.136 Finally, when 
                                                
128 Id. at 1296. 
129 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
130 Id. at 993-95. 
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assessing damages for design patent infringement, judges do not apportion 
the value of damages between infringing and non-infringing elements.  
Infringers are on the hook for all profits lost because of the infringement, 
without respect to the proportion of those profits that were driven by non-
infringing elements.137 
 As we discussed above, granting creators exclusive rights over 
partially functional features, as design patent law does, can provide them 
with substantial market power. The lack of independent invention or fair 
use doctrines and the absence of damages apportionment heighten this 
power. This can create costs for consumers, who must pay more for goods 
with patented designs, and for subsequent creators, who must license 
existing designs or expend resources in designing around them. To lessen 
the risks to consumers and other creators, then, Congress made it more 
costly and more difficult to obtain protection through design patent law than 
through copyright law.  
 To obtain a design patent, a creator must submit a formal application 
to the PTO that depicts the claimed design.138 At the PTO, the claimed 
design undergoes examination to determine whether it should be granted or 
not.139 Unlike in copyright law, where the work need only be original and 
minimally creative to receive protection, the design patent statute requires 
that the claimed design be both novel and nonobvious, in parallel with the 
requirements for utility patents.140 Novelty here means newness.141 If the 
design or a substantially similar one had previously existed, the applicant 
shouldn’t receive a patent.142 In addition, if a designer of ordinary skill 
would have found it obvious to modify prior designs to create the claimed 
design, the applicant shouldn’t receive a design patent.143 As with utility 
patents, these requirements are intended to pose a much greater hurdle for 
claimants. Only those who have produced a significant innovation in 
ornamentality should be given exclusive rights to reproduce and sell it. 
 In addition, design patents receive substantial shorter protection than 
do copyrights. Design patents only last for fifteen years from the date of 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 1177 (2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011). 
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142 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
143 Id. at 1240; Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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grant.144 This is approximately 85% shorter than the duration of a copyright, 
so the benefits that accrue to a rightsholder, and thus the effects on 
competition, are substantially curtailed. 
 
*  *  * 
 
The doctrinal screens that set the boundaries between copyright, 
design patents, and utility patents thus endeavor collectively to channel 
functional and ornamental elements into the proper IP regimes. Recall that 
he law’s object is to prevent creators from obtaining rights that would 
produce negative social value. By combining creativity thresholds with 
functionality limitations, IP law strives to maximize social welfare by 
giving creators the correct set of rights. Utility patents are the most natural 
home for functional inventions, but they also involve the most exacting 
legal standards.  Design patents offer some protection for functional 
elements, but they similarly require application and examination by the 
PTO to determine whether the design meets certain legal benchmarks. This 
means that if designers will get the benefits of protection for functionality, 
they will have to show that they contributed a significant new design. 
Copyrights, by contrast, are easily obtained and last for a long time, but 
they generally cannot be used to protect functional elements and are 
leavened with other legal defenses that mitigate the ability of designers to 
leverage them into market share over functional products. 
 
D.   Costly Screens within IP 
  
The legal doctrines governing copyright and design patent law are 
meant to channel designs with functional elements toward design patents 
and away from copyright.  But this between-regimes doctrinal screen is not 
the only relevant barrier to obtaining IP rights.  In addition, design patent 
law imposes a costly screen, while copyright law does not.  Copyrights 
spring into being instantly and nearly costlessly.145  This is appropriate, at 
least in theory.  Because copyrights are not thought to protect functional 
elements, they cannot usually provide substantial market power to 
designers.146  The independent creation doctrine, as well as the suite of 
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other doctrines that characterize copyright law, similarly limit the power of 
a copyright.147  Copyright law’s functionality screen should thus prevent the 
existence of high private value/negative social value rights. In addition, 
there should be relatively few low private value/negative social value 
copyrights, though potentially some low private value/positive social value 
ones.148  These are the conditions under which a costly screen would 
normally do more harm than good, and thus it seems appropriate that 
copyright law does not establish one.149 
With respect to design patents, the opposite is true.  Applicants 
seeking design patents must first apply to the PTO and have their patent 
applications examined, as we have explained.  Design patent’s doctrinal 
screen—new and nonobvious—is applied ex ante, through this process of 
application and examination, rather than only ex post through judicial 
review.150  This process of ex ante review creates financial costs for the 
applicant.  The PTO charges fees of $180 to apply for a design patent,151 
$120 to cover the search for prior art,152 $460 to have the patent 
examined,153 and $560 for the patent to be issued,154 for a total upfront cost 
of $1320.  Most applicants also hire professionals to produce the drawings 
for the applications, which costs approximately $500,155 and attorneys or 
agents to represent them, at a cost of approximately $2000 on average.156  
All told, a design patent applicant will spend approximately $5000 to obtain 
a valid patent, compared with the $40 spent by a copyright applicant.157 
These upfront fees are potentially important.  Design patent rights 
are powerful: as we explained above, not only can design patents be used to 
protect functional elements, they are also not limited by independent 
creation or fair use defenses, and victorious design patent plaintiffs can 
recover significant damages.158  This has two significant ramifications for 
the universe of potential design patents.  First, it reduces the likelihood of 
low private value/positive social value design patents, just as there are very 
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few low private value/positive social value utility patents.159  Design patent 
rights are strong enough within their scope to allow their owners to capture 
a substantial proportion of the value of any designs they have created.160  If 
a patented design is valuable in the marketplace, the design patent owner 
will generally be able to realize a significant share of that value.161  
Second, despite the operation of doctrinal screens, the power of 
design patents raises the prospect of numerous low private value/negative 
social value design patents.  Each existing design patent increases costs for 
future designers in ways that copyrights do not.  A new designer who 
wishes to patent a design must comb through the thicket of existing designs 
to determine whether someone has already patented a similar design.162  
This is because there is no independent creation defense to design patent 
infringement—even if the second designer has no knowledge of the 
patented design, she may still be held liable for infringement.163 By 
contrast, an author seeking to protect a design through copyright need not 
prove that her design is novel, need not worry about infringing a pre-
existing design (so long as she did not copy it), and thus need not search the 
existing stock of copyrighted designs before proceeding.164 Each newly 
granted design patent imposes a small social cost by contributing to the 
mass of existing designs that a new designer must navigate.165  
In addition, because there is no independent creation defense, even 
weak design patents can be used to file nuisance lawsuits and extract 
settlements. Potential damages from design patent infringement are so high 
that many defendants will settle rather than challenging patents that appear 
to be invalid or not infringed.166 This gives rise to the possibility that 
owners of design patents that are likely invalid or not infringed might 
nonetheless be able to extract small payments from lawsuit targets without 
having to litigate those patents to final judgment.167 As in the utility patent 
context, these types of lawsuits create negative social value. They impose a 
                                                
159 See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, at 706-08 (explaining why low private value/positive 
social value patents are unlikely to exist in large numbers). 
160 Sarah Burstein, Patented Design, supra note 18 at 182 (describing how design patent holders 
can effectively use design patents in the marketplace). 
161 Id. at 183-85. 
162 See Sarah Burstein, Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design Patents, 17 STAN. L. 
REV. 305, 316-18 (2013) (“Moving Beyond”) (explaining the process by which designers attempt to 
determine whether new designs are patentable or whether they can be employed without violating 
another’s patent).  
163 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (imposing no scienter requirement). 
164 See supra Part I.B. 
165 See Burstein, Moving Beyond, supra note 162, at 320 (describing the search process). 
166 Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 29, at 131. 
167  For discussion of the prospect of design patent trolls, see Tim Sparapani, Stretched Too Far: 
Convoluted Design Patent Rules Empower Patent Trolls, FORBES, Dec. 3, 2015, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/12/03/stretched-too-far-convoluted-design-patent-
rules-empower-patent-trolls/  
28 DESIGN PROTECTION [3-Nov-17 
tax on other designers without leading to the contribution of valuable new 
designs.168 
Although design patent law’s creativity threshold attempts to 
exclude negative social value rights when they are insufficiently clever, the 
novelty and nonobviousness requirements are imperfect proxies for social 
value. Many designs that are new and nonobvious are still nonetheless 
undesirable. A designer may create a unique shape for a shoe that turns out 
to be both uncomfortable and unattractive. If the patented design turns out 
not to be socially useful, then the patent has net negative social value, but 
the doctrinal screen would not have been able to eliminate it. 
Taken together, these considerations indicate that design patents are 
ripe for application of a costly screen.  Recall that a costly screen will only 
affect the issuance of low private value patents.169  Designers will still seek 
high private value patents regardless of any screen—it will just be more 
expensive for them to do so.  There are very few low private value/positive 
social value patents, so a costly screen will not negatively affect any such 
grants (or the underlying designs).  At the same time, a costly screen might 
deter the filing of many low private value/negative social value design 
patents. If it simply reduces the number of low-value design patents that are 
filed and must later be navigated, that is a social gain; if it similarly reduces 
the number of nuisance-value suits that are filed, that would be a benefit as 
well. 
The upshot is that if the IP system were operating properly, doctrinal 
and costly screens would combine to select for predominantly social 
welfare-enhancing patents.  Copyright’s high functionality screen would 
channel any design covering a functional element toward design patents.  
There, design patent’s high creativity screen would ensure that only truly 
innovative designs were rewarded with patent protection, and the costly 
screen would eliminate many (though surely not all) of the weak, negative 
social value patents that might otherwise be granted.  Designers who opted 
out of the high design patent screens and into copyright protection would 
receive only a much thinner right that would create many fewer social 
costs.170  The problem, as we will demonstrate, is that the doctrinal and 
costly screens within copyright and design patent law are not functioning in 
this seamless manner. 
 
III.  THE BREAKDOWN OF FUNCTIONALITY SCREENING 
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 Channeling functionality via a combination of doctrinal and costly 
screens makes a lot of sense. Ideally, the system should mitigate the risk of 
negative social value IP rights by making it difficult and costly for 
claimants to obtain protection for functional creations and the market power 
that goes with it. Unfortunately, we don’t live in an ideal world, and lately, 
the situation has gotten even worse. As we explain below, copyright law’s 
high functionality screen for useful articles has vanished, and design patent 
law’s high creativity threshold and costly examination do not, in fact, exist.  
 
A.    Star Athletica and the Lowering of Copyright Law’s 
Functionality Bar 
 
 Under the system established by the 1976 Act, copyright law, with 
its virtually nonexistent creativity threshold and nearly costless screen, was 
meant to be the home for solely nonfunctional designs or at least the 
completely nonfunctional elements of designs.171 The useful articles 
doctrine would screen out any utilitarian aspects of an article that were not 
capable of being identified separately and existing independently of the 
article’s nonfunctional features. In its recent opinion in the case of Star 
Athletica v. Varsity Brands, however, the US Supreme Court tore down 
copyright law’s high functionality bar and replaced it with one that 
resembles design patent law.172 
 The case involved two-dimensional designs of stripes, chevrons, and 
color-blocking that were incorporated into cheerleading uniforms. The 
placement of these design features on the uniforms was partially 
functional.173 Although the designs may have been visually appealing in 
their own right, that’s not why they were chosen.  They also served to affect 
the appearance of the wearer’s body, emphasizing certain body parts and 
deemphasizing others, and to identify the wearer as a cheerleader.174 Unlike 
a decal of a team logo or mascot that could be attached to the uniform for 
purely nonfunctional reasons, the designs at issue in the case were dual-
nature—they were simultaneously expressive and utilitarian.175 According 
to decades of appellate opinions interpreting the 1976 Act’s useful articles 
doctrine, the designs should have been categorically uncopyrightable.176  
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 Justice Thomas’s opinion for the majority of the Court interpreted 
the statute in a much more lenient fashion. According to the Court, design 
elements could be copyrightable if they meet two criteria: (1) that the 
decisionmaker can spot elements that appear to have pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural qualities and (2) that the feature could exist in a work once it is 
imagined apart from the useful article.177 The first step, which the Court 
noted was “not onerous,” only seems to require the decisionmaker to find 
something at least partially nonfunctional about the design of object, even if 
it was intertwined with functional elements. The second step then asks 
whether those features could be “imaginatively separated” and depicted or 
reproduced in some non-useful article. Because the stripes, chevrons, and 
colorblocking “hav[e] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities,”178 and 
because they could have been depicted on a piece of paper or canvas,179 
they met the Court’s test for copyrightability. 
 While this might seem like a fairly straightforward reading of the 
statute, its novelty and extremity emerge from Justice Thomas’s discussion 
of the nature of the imagining and separating that he has in mind. He 
explains that once the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the article 
have been separated, the “imagined remainder” need not be “a fully 
functioning useful article at all, much less an equally useful one.”180 
Referring to the view that copyright law should only protect solely artistic 
features as “flawed,” the majority instead claims that copyright can extend 
to a design feature “even if it makes that article more useful.”181 A feature 
can now count as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature even 
though it imparts significant utility to the article, and indeed even though 
the article couldn’t function at all without it.  Under this approach, 
copyright law can now protect things like aerodynamic elements of a car 
that make it drive faster or with less wind resistance, and perhaps even 
things like the pattern of tire treads that are designed for functional purposes 
but that could be imagined as works of abstract art. 
 The Court’s opinion in Star Athletica thus fundamentally altered the 
nature of copyright law’s functionality screen.182 Instead of jettisoning dual-
nature features and channeling them to design patent law, copyright law 
will now protect features of applied art and industrial design that contribute 
to the article’s function. The opinion replaces copyright law’s high doctrinal 
screen for functionality with one that in fact resembles design patent law’s 
much more accommodating standard—but, of course, while also retaining 
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copyright law’s low creativity threshold and costless examination and 
registration.183 
 The design at issue in Star Athletica highlights the significance of 
this combination of screens. Because the Court lowered copyright law’s 
functionality bar, the cheerleading uniforms are not categorically excluded 
from protection. Instead, they will only fail to obtain protection if they 
cannot meet copyright law’s creativity threshold, which requires that they 
be original and more than minimally creative. Given how low that threshold 
is, these designs, as trivial and obvious as they are, may still be able to cross 
it. Accordingly, the designers would obtain IP protection for functional 
aspects of their creations without establishing that they have made a 
substantial innovation or even having to pay much money to the 
government.184 
 The risk posed by Star Athletica is clear—creators of highly 
functional designs, which typically would have been channeled out of 
copyright into design patent law, can now obtain copyright protection. 
Copyright’s previously rigorous functionality screen now resembles design 
patent’s generous and flexible functionality screen.185 
 
B.   The Failure of Design Patent’s Screens 
  
By contrast to copyright, design patent law is meant to couple laxer 
rules on functionality with (1) a high doctrinal creativity screen and (2) a 
significant costly screen.  In reality, however, neither of these screens is 
operating as intended.  Consider first the doctrinal screen.  At least in 
theory, design patents should be subjected to substantial scrutiny to ensure 
that they are novel and nonobvious.  This is the tradeoff that designers make 
in order to obtain the ability to protect functional elements related to 
designs and the market power that accompanies it.  Designers should only 
be able to obtain significant market power if they have contributed a truly 
new and innovative design. 
 In reality, however, design patent’s doctrinal creativity screen is 
largely toothless.  The PTO rejects only 2% of designs for novelty or 
obviousness.186  Moreover, it is not as if this high grant rate is being driven 
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defense against turning copyrights into backdoor utility patents has been breached. 
186 Dennis Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
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by the fact that designers are playing it safe and only applying for patents 
on designs that are clearly novel.  Even a quick perusal of some of the 
design patents granted by the PTO reveals that designers are regularly able 
to obtain patents on designs that are so familiar they should have been 
obvious.187 
 Design patent law’s creativity screen is failing for two distinct but 
related reasons. First, neither the PTO nor the courts appear to treating the 
novelty and nonobviousness thresholds as rigorously in design patent law as 
they do in utility patent law.188 For known prior art to invalidate a design 
patent for lacking novelty, the PTO and courts seem to require that the two 
designs be identical in every feature. In the case of Apple v. Samsung, for 
example, the Federal Circuit upheld Apple’s design patents on the 
rectangular shape of the iPad even though there were very similar 
references in the prior art.189 
 
Figure 1: Apple’s Novel and Nonobvious Design 
 
 
Cases like this illustrate that decisionmakers are simply interpreting 
the existing doctrinal to impose a lower hurdle on claimants than the 
statutory language suggests. In fact, the creativity threshold in design patent 
law is so low that it hardly seems different from copyright law’s originality 
requirement. 
 Further, designers whose patent applications are rejected can keep 
coming back to the PTO and filing requests for further examination.  No 
application can ever be finally rejected; the designer can always refile, and 
in so doing wear down the PTO examiner until the patent is finally 
                                                                                                                       
(2010).  
187 Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 29, at 125. 
188 Crouch, supra note 186. 
189 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1326-30 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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granted.190  In this respect, the process for obtaining a design patent mirrors 
the process for obtaining a utility patent, which is known to contribute to 
the excess of poor-quality utility patents that are granted.  
 The second reason for design patent law’s incredibly low rejection 
rate is that it is quite difficult for the PTO to effectively examine design 
patents.  Design patents are not as easily searched as utility patents, and 
they cannot be identified as easily using keywords.  This is part of the 
challenge associated with comparisons based entirely on visual claims.191 
All told, the PTO has a difficult time determining whether a design is 
actually new and nonobvious, and the result is a proliferation of patents that 
should not exist. 
Both the PTO and defendants are further hampered in challenging 
design patents’ validity by recent changes to the doctrines of ornamentality 
and functionality.192  While design patent law allows more protection of 
hybrid functional-aesthetic elements than copyright law traditionally did, it 
should not protect purely utilitarian product features.  But recent case law 
has all but abandoned that functionality limitation, allowing protection even 
of purely functional elements where the alternative is not to protect a 
particular element of a design.193 Design patent’s already lax doctrinal 
screen has become even laxer. 
The Federal Circuit has proven willing to protect even the purely 
functional aspects of design as long as they have some relationship with 
ornamental ones. For example, in Sport Dimension v. Coleman, the case 
mentioned in the Introduction, the design patent at issue covered a life 
jacket-style flotation device with armbands.194 During claim construction, 
the district court excluded the armbands from the claim, because it found 
them to be functional.195 The Federal Circuit agreed that the armbands were 
functional, but it held that they were wrongly excluded from the claim.196 
Instead, it held that the district court should have viewed the design as a 
whole, including the functional features.197 As long as there was some 
ornamentation, design patent law would protect that ornamentation even 
though it served a functional purpose.198  
                                                
190   Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 77 (2004). 
191   On the problem of defining and analyzing the scope of visual works elsewhere in IP, see 
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 
(2013). 
192 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10. 
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194 820 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
195 Sport Dimension, Inc. v. The Coleman Company, Inc., 2015 WL 13309300 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
196 Sport Dimension, 820 F.3d at 1321. 
197 Id. at 1323. 
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Similarly, in Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. Covidien,199 the district court 
had “factored out” certain elements of a handle for ultrasonic shears – like 
the trigger and an on-off button – that were driven by functional 
considerations.  The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that as long as the 
entirety of the design was not fully dictated by functional considerations 
courts could not exclude the individually functional elements from 
protection.200  It specifically noted that the scope of the design patents 
extended to the combination of those elements even though they were 
functional.201   
Even if courts were to reverse course and apply more traditional 
understandings of novelty and functionality, that would be only a partial 
solution to the problem.  If a design patent is granted, it still has some value 
to its owner, even if it is possible (or even likely) that it would later be 
invalidated if challenged in court.  If the patent’s invalidity is not obvious or 
certain, or if the cost of discovering that invalidity is high, the patent’s 
owner will usually be able to extract a settlement of some value from an 
accused infringer.  The settlement may be substantial, if the patent’s validity 
is plausible, or it may be merely a nuisance-value settlement.  But it will not 
be zero.  And the settlement value will be enhanced by the high level of 
damages available to patent plaintiffs.  If design patent owners are able to 
realize private value through even invalid patents, they are imposing costs 
on consumers and other designers.  These are low private value/negative 
social value patents that design patent’s failing doctrinal screen is allowing 
to slip through. 
Such patents should in theory be deterred by design patent’s costly 
screen, which would make it sufficiently expensive that applicants would 
refrain from trying to obtain these types of invalid patents.  In reality, 
however, design patent’s costly screen is not nearly as effective as one 
might hope.  Recall that the total cost of obtaining a design patent is roughly 
$5000.202  This is not trivial, but it pales in comparison to the cost of 
obtaining a utility patent, which is approximately $35,000 in fees to the 
PTO203 and the applicant’s attorney.204  Five thousand dollars is also much 
                                                
199   796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
200   Id. at 1334. 
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202 See supra Part I.C. 
203 A utility patent application requires payment of $280 in filing fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a), $600 
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C.F.R. 1.20(e), (f), (g).  Design patents, by contrast, do not need to pay maintenance fees.  
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less than what even a dubious design patent might be worth.  Again, the 
potential for design patent owners to win substantial damages awards due to 
the lack of damages apportionment can turn even questionable patents into 
valuable private assets.  An upfront application cost of $5000 will weed out 
only the most frivolous design patent applications while allowing many 
others through.  In light of the incentives that designers face to file for even 
weaker design patents, knowing that they are likely to be granted, this too-
low costly screen poses significant problems.  Designers can (and do) 
obtain multiple patents on different configurations of their designs.205 That 
they do this suggests that the costly screen isn’t very costly. And, because 
they can submit dozens of applications simultaneously, the costs of drafting 
and prosecution are probably even lower. 
The upshot is that design patents are too easy to obtain, both as a 
matter of doctrine and expense.  Design patent law is meant to only award 
these powerful IP rights to designers who have contributed valuable new 
designs, and it is meant to deter putative applicants from even applying for 
low private value/negative social value designs.  It accomplishes neither of 
these tasks.  By consequence, every day there are design patents granted 
that do more harm than good, driving up prices for consumers and taxing 
genuine creativity.  If either the doctrinal screen or the costly screen had 
failed independently, the problem would be significant.  The simultaneous 
and conjoint failures of both screens is calamitous.   And it goes some way 
toward explaining the dramatic rise in design patenting. 
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Figure 2: Design Patents Issued Per Year206 
 
  
 
C. The Additional Problem with Overlapping Trade Dress Protection 
 
 However well or poorly copyright and patent laws might be doing to 
properly incentivize innovation in design by channeling creations to the 
appropriate doctrine, that task is further complicated by the availability of 
design protection via trade dress law. As we explained above, designers can 
assert exclusive rights in the shape of a product or its packaging under trade 
dress law.207 These rights are not meant to stimulate new creativity in 
design, but instead to prevent consumers from being confused about the 
product’s origin. For example, if consumers associate the rubber toe bumper 
and molding on a shoe as an indication that the shoe was produced by 
Converse, then Converse can attempt to use trade dress law to prevent 
competitors from making similarly designed shoes.208 But trade dress 
protection fits uneasily within the channeling scheme that Congress created 
for copyrights and design patents, and it renders the task of screening 
designs even more difficult.209 
                                                
206 This chart was borrowed from Patently-O, https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/08/design-
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207 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
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209 See Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
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 Because trade dress law allows firms to obtain protection for 
product design, it shares copyright and design patent laws’ concerns with 
extending protection to market power conveying functionality.210 But trade 
dress law’s doctrinal and costly screens differ from those used by the other 
regimes. Trademark law imposes no creativity threshold for marks or 
designs. A design is protectable even if it is identical to prior designs and 
was copied from them as long as the claimant can establish that consumers 
treat the design as indicating the source of the product.211 This non-
threshold is not even as rigorous as copyright law’s trivial originality 
requirement. Trademark protection is, however, subject to a costly screen, 
although one that operates differently from patent law’s. Trademarks and 
trade dress can be registered with the PTO and, if so, are subject to 
examination by the office. While registration will only cost several hundred 
dollars, the price for trade dress protection is actually much higher. This is 
because trade dress is only protectable once it has acquired 
distinctiveness,212 and a company often must spend an enormous amount of 
money on marketing to get consumers to associate the design with the 
company. So although the examination and fees for trade dress protection 
are cheaper than utility patent law’s, trade dress law’s doctrinal screen 
requiring secondary meaning for protection actually imposes a substantial 
cost.   
 Trade dress law also imposes a doctrinal functionality screen that 
resembles the one copyright law used prior to Star Athletica.213 To the 
extent that a producer attempts to claim protection for an aspect of the 
design that is “necessary to the success of the article or . . . affects the cost 
or quality of the article,” it is unprotectable.214 This functionality screen is 
more rigorous than design patent law’s (and presumably the post-Star 
Athletica copyright screen), as demonstrated by Apple v. Samsung, where 
the Federal Circuit treated features of the iPhone as unprotectable by trade 
dress law but protectable by design patent law.215 Whether courts and the 
PTO apply the functionality screen with consistent rigor is a separate issue. 
For example, the registered trade dress of Coca-Cola’s distinctive bottle 
                                                                                                                       
873 (2010).  Cf. Robert Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183 
(2015). 
210 Id. 
211 The design is protectable if it has acquired “secondary meaning” as a designation of the 
source of the goods. 
212 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212-14 (2000). 
213 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10.  
214 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (holding that a dual 
spring design for a sign could not receive trademark protection because it was functional, as 
evidenced by an expired utility patent). 
215 Apple, 786 F.3d at 989-99. 
38 DESIGN PROTECTION [3-Nov-17 
design or Converse’s rubber toe bumper and molding both contribute to 
their designs’ functionality.216  
 Trade dress law isn’t part of Congress’s scheme to optimize 
innovation in design by channeling creations to the correct regime, and it 
sits awkwardly alongside that scheme.217 Although it imposes a significant 
functionality bar and an indirectly costly screen, trade dress law has no 
creativity threshold.218 Moreover, trade dress protection, once obtained, can 
last forever.219 As we explained above, creativity thresholds operate as 
doctrinal screens that minimize the risk of high private value-negative 
social value rights by requiring the claimant to have produced something 
innovative.220 Trade dress law makes no effort to ensure that rights are only 
granted to designs that contribute to social welfare.221 Accordingly, it must 
rely entirely on its functionality screen to prevent designers from obtaining 
rights that will hinder competition and innovation.  
  
D. The Dystopian Reality of IP Screening 
 
 The principal concern generated by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Star Athletica is that copyright law will no longer rigorously police 
functionality. This would allow designers to obtain protection for the 
functional elements of designs via copyright without having to overcome 
design patent law’s high creativity threshold, short duration, and costly 
screen. This protection would then last for a century, rather than design 
patent’s 15 years. 
As we have just explained, however, many of the benefits of 
channeling functional designs away from copyright and into the design 
patent regime are chimerical. Very few designs are excluded by the latter’s 
doctrinal creativity screens, and its supposedly costly screen isn’t very 
costly. Design patent law’s screens are already allowing through nearly 
every plausible design. In addition, we suspect that the enormous difference 
in duration between copyrights and design patents may not, in fact, be all 
that meaningful in practice. Product designs, including those that 
                                                
216 In the matter of Certain Footwear Products, U.S. Internat’l Trade Comm. Inv. No. 337-TA-
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incorporate functionality, tend to have relatively short shelf lives,222 so the 
market power differences between fifteen years and a century are not that 
great. IP protection that covered the shape of a floppy diskette, film 
canister, or fax machine would already have virtually zero value, because 
those products have become obsolete.223 All the additional years of 
copyright protection that would extend beyond the fifteen-year design 
patent term would generate little private value or social cost. In cases like 
these, where the product is truly obsolete, we would not even expect rights 
to have significant nuisance value or impose substantial search costs, since 
competitors also aren’t trying to make these products. While some industrial 
designs have enduring market value—the Eames chair, the Burberry trench 
coat, or the classic Coca-Cola bottle—these are the exceptions that prove 
the rule of short shelf life.224 
 Design patent law isn’t doing its job of limiting the costs of IP 
protection for functional designs via short duration, creativity thresholds, or 
costly screens. Maybe, then, copyright law’s failure to channel functional 
creations to design patent law post-Star Athletica won’t matter so much, 
since designers put to the choice might have opted for a design patent over 
copyright anyway. If designers do seeks copyrights where they would have 
otherwise had to seek design patents, copyright’s limiting doctrines could 
play an important role in influencing innovation and competition. As we 
explained in Part I, copyright law, but not design patent law, does not 
impose liability on competitors who independently create their own 
designs.225 Unless a copyright plaintiff can prove that the defendant actually 
knew of and copied her design, the infringement action will fail. The holder 
of a design patent, by contrast, can recover from anyone who makes or uses 
the design, whether they knew of its existence and copied it or not.226 We 
suspect that copyright law’s independent creation doctrine is even more 
important for industrial design than it is for more typical copyright works 
like novels and movies. The opportunities for human cultural expression, 
while not infinite, are, nonetheless, vast.227 Although Judge Learned Hand 
discusses the possibility that “a man who had never known it [might] 
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compose anew Keats’s ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn,’”228 this is incredibly 
unlikely to happen. That two designers of handheld smart phones might hit 
upon the same idea for its shape, however, seems not only possible but 
probable, given the physical limitations of the human hand.229 Precisely 
because industrial design incorporates utilitarian features which tolerate 
fairly few variations, independent creation of the same design is likely to 
often occur.  
 Copyright law’s other limiting doctrines may further minimize the 
social costs from diminished competition relative to design patent law. 
Copyright law’s infringement analysis should filter out functional aspects of 
the design even if the useful articles doctrine no longer does, limiting the 
comparison between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works to their 
expressive, non-functional features.230 Courts have done this for other 
highly functional works like computer software and architecture, and we 
hope that they will continue the practice now that they will have to deal 
with industrial designs.231 A similar analogy holds for copyright’s fair use 
doctrine, which can vitiate defendants’ prima facie liability if they can show 
that their copying was based on functional necessity.232 Imagine, for 
example, that a car manufacturer attempted to control the market for 
replacement or add-on parts for its vehicles by claiming a copyright over 
their design—something that might now be possible in light of Star 
Athletica. If the only way that competitors could produce interoperable parts 
were to copy aspects of the manufacturer’s design, the competitors would 
have a strong argument for fair use based on computer software caselaw.233 
Design patent law does not have comparable doctrines and so subjects 
defendants to potential liability for copying functional components of the 
plaintiff’s design. 
 Finally, recall that copyright law has a much more sensible approach 
to infringement damages than design patent law.234 When design patent law 
calculates the plaintiff’s damages, it does not apportion value based on 
infringing and non-infringing elements of the defendant’s design. The 
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defendant must pay for all of the plaintiff’s lost profits.235 Copyright law, 
however, limits the plaintiff’s recovery to any royalties that were 
attributable to the defendant’s infringement.236 The plaintiff won’t recover 
for any losses that may have arose from similarity between non-copyrighted 
elements of the design. This difference means that the potential negative 
social value from nuisance suits will be lower in copyright infringement 
cases than in design patent cases, all else equal, so the risks to competition 
from inappropriately granted rights will also be lower. 
 Yet all of this good news about copyright does not tell the whole 
story.  Even if copyrights after Star Athletica are still no stronger than 
design patents on the whole, this does not mean that Star Athletica has done 
no harm.  And it does not mean that if design law overreaches, it still 
overreaches largely through design patents.  There are two reasons for this.  
First, while the costly screen of design patents isn’t very costly, it is still 
more expensive than obtaining a copyright, which is effectively free.237 The 
choice between copyright and design patent protection is a tradeoff between 
cost and strength of protection.  Increasing the strength of copyright 
protection without increasing its cost makes choosing copyright more 
attractive. 
 The second reason is more fundamental: designers are not required 
to select only one of the available design regimes. There is no doctrine of 
election that requires a designer to choose between copyright and design 
patent when obtaining IP over a design. Rather, any designer can seek both 
types of protection for the same designs, without limitation. In addition, the 
designer is also able to seek trade dress protection running parallel to 
copyright and design patent protection.  The existence of trade dress 
protection intersecting with the channeling regime that Congress designed 
for copyrights and design patents further complicates the murky picture for 
design law. Instead of a simple world of channeling between copyright 
law’s low creativity threshold, high functionality bar, and costless screen 
and design patent law’s high creativity threshold, low functionality bar, and 
costly screen, we must add trade dress law’s unusual combination of 
screens and its different aims. Determining how to distribute rights over 
product design in an optimal fashion is thus even harder. 
 The ability to choose copyright, trade dress, and design patent 
protection for the same design element creates all sorts of opportunities for 
designers to exploit the overlapping advantages of these systems. For 
instance, it is typically easier for a plaintiff to prove that a design patent is 
infringed than to prove that a copyright is infringed, for reasons we have 
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detailed above.  At the same time, it is typically more difficult for a 
defendant to prove that a copyright is invalid than to prove that a design 
patent is invalid. (Design patents are only valid if they are novel and 
nonobvious, while copyright contains no such limitation.) Accordingly, a 
designer could seek both copyrights and design patents and choose which 
right to enforce against a given defendant depending upon whether that 
defendant is likely to have better defenses related to infringement—in 
which case the plaintiff will assert design patents—or invalidity—in which 
case the plaintiff will assert copyrights. 
 Similarly, designers can choose which rights to assert to maximize 
their potential damages recovery. If the design encompasses all aspects of 
the infringing product, the designer can assert copyrights, knowing that she 
will be able to obtain essentially full damages because the profit is 
attributable entirely to the design. If the infringing product involves both 
infringing and non-infringing design elements, the plaintiff can elect instead 
to assert design patent rights in order to avoid having damages apportioned 
and, for instance, capture the profits of an entire car based solely on the 
design of the chassis.238 
Copyrights also offer the option of obtaining what amount to 
“design patent lite” protection for decades after the design patent has 
expired. The designer could rely upon the more powerful design patents for 
the first 15 years, then switch to copyrights after the design patents have 
expired. As we explained, in many cases the extra decades of protection 
will be largely irrelevant.239 But the ability to capture those additional out-
years of rents will be valuable to some designers, and these designers can 
do so at roughly zero cost. 
Most importantly, and most realistically, designers can assert both 
types of rights against the same defendants in the same cases.240 If the two 
causes of action are at all independent—that is, if they do not rise or fall on 
precisely the same factors—designers will have two bites at the same apple. 
Even if the design patent claim founders for some reason, the copyright 
claim may still prevail, or vice versa. Simply as a matter of mathematics, a 
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design plaintiff can transform two dubious rights into one source of strong 
protection. For instance, imagine that a design patent and a copyright are 
each only 50% likely to be found valid and infringed by a particular 
defendant design. If the two causes of action are completely independent, 
the plaintiff is 75% likely to prevail on at least one of the two. Of course, it 
is unlikely that the two causes of action will ever be entirely independent, 
particularly on the issue of infringement. But even partial independence will 
allow the IP holder to leverage them in litigation beyond what the 
underlying design warrants. Moreover, by bringing two claims instead of 
one, the plaintiff will increase the defendant’s litigation costs to defend 
through trial. In other contexts, scholars have demonstrated that offering IP 
rights-holders the choice between two legal regimes can artificially inflate 
the power of IP rights and distort the operation of the IP system.241 Option 
value by itself is bad enough.  Permitting designers to opt for both IP 
regimes is potentially far worse. 
 
IV.  WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
 The problem, then, is simple, if counterintuitive: it’s too easy and 
too cheap to protect the functional aspects of designs.  The law gives people 
too many ways to obtain too many rights too cheaply.  As a result, IP law 
grants design rights that are broader than they should be, rights that aren’t 
worth the social cost to have around, and rights that overlap in ways that 
undo the calibration individual IP regimes are supposed to provide.  In this 
section, we consider policy changes designed to bring private costs and 
benefits more in line with social welfare. 
 
A. Reining in Overpowered Design Rights 
  
One set of approaches focuses on the fact that design rights have 
become too powerful, inducing too many designers to seek and enforce 
protection even when it is not socially optimal to do so (for instance, when 
the defendant independently created their design and it is not identical).  We 
consider several approaches to mitigate the excessive power of design rights 
in this section. 
 
Many of the problems discussed above stem from the ability of IP 
owners to use tools directed at ornamentation (design patent, copyright) or 
reputation (trademark) to achieve what the law intends only utility patents 
                                                
241 Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 15-18 (2011) 
(describing the distortions introduced when plaintiffs have the option of selecting between two 
damages regimes). 
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to provide: control over the function of the item itself.242  One solution to 
the problem is to try to shore up the screens that prevent design-related 
rights from bleeding over into backdoor utility patents.  This won’t make 
design rights more costly, but it will reduce the ability to capture 
inappropriate value—value in excess of what the designer has really 
created—with those rights.  It will therefore reduce the temptation to invest 
in negative social value rights that generate positive private value.  A 
number of scholars have suggested ways to shore up these screens.243 
As we mentioned in Part II, neither the PTO nor the courts seem to 
be applying the nominally high creativity threshold that design patent law 
demands. Patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness standards are intended 
to impose a significant hurdle for claimants. But while the PTO and the 
courts have demonstrated some willingness to reject utility patents on these 
grounds, they have not done so for design patents.244 When prior art 
discloses a design that substantially anticipates the principal features of the 
claimant’s design, as with Apple’s patent on a rectangle with rounded 
corners, the PTO should deny the patent or the courts should invalidate it. 
Design patent law shouldn’t grant substantially stronger protection than 
copyright while simultaneously applying a similarly trivial creativity 
threshold. 
Copyright has the converse problem.  Just as design patent law has 
begun to resemble copyright’s lax approach to creativity screening, so too 
has copyright’s functionality screen moved towards design patent law’s lax 
functionality standard.245   
But there may still be ways for courts to restore the division between 
design and function that Congress intended.  In design patents, the 
effective elimination of the functionality screen is a creation of the Federal 
Circuit.  It finds no basis in Supreme Court precedent, and it is at odds with 
the way functionality is treated in trademark cases.  Indeed, in Apple v. 
Samsung, the Federal Circuit went so far as to hold that the very same 
features both were functional under trademark law and were not functional 
under design patent law.246   The Supreme Court declined to resolve that 
issue, rejecting the design patent verdict on damages instead.247 The Court 
should take a case to resolve this issue, and when it does, it should 
reintroduce an effective form of functionality screening to design patents, 
as the statute requires and as historically was true before recent Federal 
                                                
242 Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 10. 
243 Id.; McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 41; Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming 
Design (working paper 2017); Risch, supra note 205, at 62-64. 
244 See supra Part II.D. 
245 See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text. 
246 Apple, Inc., 786 F.3d at 991-92. 
247 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 429 (2016). 
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Circuit decisions.248  Applying Richardson and rejecting Coleman would 
be a good start.   
Copyright functionality is a somewhat harder problem, because the 
Supreme Court seemed to suggest in Star Athletica that copyright could 
protect even the functional aspects of a utilitarian work as long as courts 
could envision creative elements in that work.249  That risks making 
copyright design protection cheap indeed, while eliminating the filters on 
scope that prevented every copyright in a utilitarian work from becoming 
an automatic backdoor utility patent.250 It’s not clear that the Court 
intended to dismantle the functionality screen in copyright, rather than 
simply concluding that there was something worth protecting in a simple 
design for a cheerleader uniform.  And it is entirely possible that courts 
interpreting Star Athletica will grant protection to such works but narrow 
the scope of that protection to avoid effectively copyrighting function.251 
That’s what we think they should do, if the case isn’t going to be changed 
by statute.252  Doing so would reduce the incidence of cheap copyrights 
with negative social value that impede the creation of others.  But there is 
no question that Star Athletica made the line between design protection 
and functional IP rights fuzzier than ever.  In an ideal world Congress 
would pass new legislation overriding Star Athletica and restoring the 
traditional meaning of section 101.  But since that seems unlikely, courts 
will need to consider other options. 
 
B.   Election of Rights 
 
A second way to tackle the problem of cheap backdoor utility 
patents is to focus on the problem of overlap between IP rights.  As we 
noted in Part I, at least before Star Athletica different IP regimes were 
calibrated in different ways.  Design patents were intended to be rarer, more 
costly, shorter, and harder to get than copyrights, but they conferred 
significantly stronger rights.  Copyrights were cheap and simple to get, but 
came with significant limitations designed to prevent their use as backdoor 
utility patents.  And trademark law has special requirements that limit its 
                                                
248 Risch, supra note 205, at 73-77. 
249 137 S. Ct. at 1013-14. 
250 That’s not what Congress intended.  Indeed, it is notable that the Court, in an opinion 
otherwise purportedly concerned with the plain meaning of the statute, ignored completely the most 
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functional elements). 
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use to particular circumstances in which a design is valued not for what it is, 
but for what it represents.  In the best-case scenario, creations would be 
channeled to the one correct doctrinal bucket that appropriately balanced 
costs and benefits for designs of that type. When the channeling doctrines 
didn’t work as well, the designer of a particular article could treat IP rights 
as a menu of options, choosing the IP right that provides the most valuable 
fit for her needs.   
The concept of one choice from a menu of options was an 
appropriate metaphor for much of IP law’s history.  Under the doctrine of 
election, a creator had to choose one – but only one – form of protection for 
her work.253  We don’t mean that a design couldn’t fall within the subject 
matter of more than one IP regime; it is well established that copyright, 
design patent, utility patent, and trade dress might overlap in what they 
cover.  Rather, the doctrine of election meant that where two or more IP 
rights did overlap, the IP owner had to choose which form of protection she 
wanted.   Obtaining a design patent meant foregoing copyright protection 
for the same item, and vice versa.  A copyright or design patent over a work 
meant the shape of the work wasn’t also eligible for trade dress 
protection.254  The doctrine of election meant that there wasn’t any problem 
of overlapping rights, because there weren’t multiple rights to overlap.  
The doctrine of election was rejected by the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals in 1974 in In re Yardley.255  That case held that a watch 
featuring a caricature of then-Vice President Spiro Agnew could be both 
copyrighted and design patented.  Yardley was based on the (correct) 
proposition that different IP rights have different purposes, and if a work 
has many parts it may be appropriate to protect different parts with different 
regimes.  We have no quarrel with that reasoning.  Indeed, utility patents 
and design patents have long protected different aspects of the same 
product.256  But the absence of a doctrine of election has increasingly meant 
                                                
253 See Douglas R. Wolf, The Doctrine of Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9 
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255 In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).  
256 E.g., Samsung v. Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429, 433-35 (2016) (noting that the same devices can be 
protected by both design patents and utility patents). 
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that IP owners use different IP regimes to protect the same aspects of their 
works, leading to overlapping protection.257  Thus, a designer might obtain 
a design patent with its relatively strong rights, then claim a copyright in the 
same aspects of the work once the design patent expires, and even claim a 
trademark in the design should the copyright ever expire.258 As we 
described in Part III, this allows a designer to leverage the advantages of all 
of these systems simultaneously, rather than accepting the limitations of a 
given system as the price of obtaining its benefits.259 The result is a further 
increase in the power of design rights created purely by this option value. 
Perhaps it is time to bring back the doctrine of election, at least to 
the extent that any particular design feature may be protected by only one 
form of IP.260 The fact that it is too cheap and easy to get strong protection 
for designs means we want some way to limit the power IP grants over 
design.  An election doctrine would not solve all the problems we identified 
in Part III.  If it is too easy to get design patents, the fact that a designer 
can’t also get copyright protection on the work doesn’t fix that.  And if it is 
too easy to protect functionality through copyright, the fact that a designer 
can’t also obtain a design patent doesn’t fix that either. But requiring 
election would solve an important class of cases in which we make design 
protection too cheap and too strong – cases in which the IP owner benefits 
from layering different protections to avoid the limits of each doctrine. That 
is particularly true when short-term rights like utility and design patents 
expire. Giving long-term or even perpetual protection through copyright or 
trade dress to elements that also got the benefits of strong patent rights 
undoes the public benefit of the patent bargain: the promise that the world 
will have access to the design once the patent expires. 
Bringing back election would not necessarily require legislative 
action.  The history of the election doctrine is curious, because its demise in 
the copyright and design patent context can be traced to one case from a 
single court of appeals, In re Yardley.261 True, that court—the Court of 
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Claims and Patent Appeals—heard all appeals from the Patent and 
Trademark Office, but at the time it didn’t even hear infringement suits.  
Meanwhile, at the time of Yardley the regional circuits and district courts 
had unanimously adopted the doctrine of election.  Nonetheless, the 
influential Nimmer treatise endorsed Yardley,262 and after Yardley people 
just started taking it for granted that a designer could protect the same 
design element using multiple IP regimes.  The Copyright Office 
acquiesced in 1995, allowing registration of works that had already been 
patented.263 
Since Yardley, the IP world has taken for granted that overlapping 
protection is the norm.  But the Supreme Court has never endorsed the 
elimination of the election doctrine.  Indeed, there are good reasons to think 
it would not do so.  Election is a commonplace in other areas of IP.  Anyone 
who files for a patent must elect to forego trade secret protection, and 
choosing trade secrecy similarly prevents later obtaining a patent.264 In one 
important decision the Court seemed to implement an election doctrine 
between copyright and trademark, sharply limiting the ability of IP owners 
to assert trademark claims that effectively protected copyrighted works once 
those copyrights had expired.265  In another, the Court held that an expired 
utility patent was strong evidence that a design feature was functional and 
could not be protected by trademark law.266  And it has repeatedly held that 
design patents preempt state design-like rights because of concerns that 
overlapping protection would allow IP owners to circumvent the 
requirements of federal design patent law.267  Congress too endorsed the 
doctrine of election when it created a new IP right covering boat hulls, 
expressly providing that obtaining a design patent prevented the designer 
from also obtaining or enforcing a registered right for boat hulls.268  While 
                                                                                                                       
The term `works of art' is deliberately intended as a broader specification than `works of 
the fine arts' in the present statute with the idea that there is subject-matter (for instance, of 
applied design, not yet within the province of design patents), which may properly be 
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Quoted in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
262 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2.19 (1994 ed).   
263 Copyright Office Circular, 60 Fed. Reg. 15605 (Mar. 24, 1995), 
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2017 ch. 2. 
265 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).   
266 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
267 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
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the Court has not considered the overlap problem in the context of 
copyright law,269 we think it should draw the same conclusions there.270 
Reinvigorating the doctrine of election is somewhat more 
complicated since the 1976 Copyright Act, because copyright protection is 
automatic.  Surely one does not “elect” copyright over design patent 
protection merely by creating a work that the law deems automatically 
within the scope of copyright. We think the doctrine of election should 
attach at the time a designer files for a design or utility patent on a product 
attribute.  Doing so should represent a choice not to enforce any copyright 
claim on that attribute. Our proposal is that courts should dismiss copyright 
lawsuits or applications for registration that are brought on the basis of 
elements that are already protected by an existing (or pending) patent. The 
creator would still own the copyright and remain an author of the work. But 
she could not enforce that copyright in court. Similarly, the Copyright 
Office should refuse to register a copyright on subject matter for which a 
patent has already been filed. 
Conversely, bringing (or perhaps threatening) a copyright lawsuit 
based on a product attribute should estop later efforts to patent (or enforce a 
patent on) that product attribute. The PTO should also dismiss any patent 
application that tries to claim an element that has already been the subject 
matter of a copyright registration or litigation. We focus here upon 
registration, litigation, and application because they are public acts that 
occur at discrete moments in time. It would be comparatively difficult (or 
impossible) to base election on the moment at which a copyright is created, 
simply because copyrights spring into existence instantaneously the 
moment that an author creates a work. Registration and litigation are when 
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that copyright becomes publicly known and reified. There is of course the 
possibility that parties might try to game this rule, particularly during the 
period during which a patent application is held secret. But we think it will 
function well in most circumstances. And it is certainly an improvement on 
the status quo. 
We think election must be limited to individual features of a 
product, rather than necessarily encompassing the product as a whole.  
Complex products can have different attributes for which different IP rights 
are appropriate.  The design of an iPhone is different from the operation of 
the WiFi technology inside that phone, and enforcing rights in one 
shouldn’t prevent enforcement of the other.  By contrast, there is no reason 
for Apple to be able to use design patent, copyright, and trademark to 
enforce rights in the same design element (the shame of the phone).  
Election would prevent disturbing results such as what occurred in Apple v. 
Samsung, where a failed trade dress case nonetheless prevailed under a 
design patent theory.271   
 
C. Narrowing the Scope of Design Rights 
 
A final approach to the problem of too-powerful design rights would 
be to narrow the scope and power of the rights we grant.  The functionality 
screens in copyright and design patent were intended to do that,272 but as we 
have seen, they aren’t working.  Congress could, however, impose limits on 
the strength of design patent rights to better align private and social value.  
One possibility is to change the current rule on design patent damages.  
Unlike every other area of IP, a finding of design patent infringement 
entitles the plaintiff to capture the defendant’s entire profit from the “article 
of manufacture” without any consideration of how valuable the design 
actually was or what else contributed to the price of the defendant’s 
product.273  As one of us has observed elsewhere, that rule makes no 
sense.274  The Supreme Court may have narrowed its reach in Samsung v. 
Apple by permitting courts to define “article of manufacture” narrowly,275 
but a rule that doesn’t consider the relative value of the design patent and 
other features of a product is absurd.  Eliminating it and applying the 
normal rules of IP damages would help tackle the problem of overpowered 
design patents. 
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Second, we might consider introducing an independent invention 
defense to design patents, as we have in copyright law.  The ease of 
obtaining design patents and the ability to seek profits way out of 
proportion to the value of the design has led some to worry about the 
problem of “design patent trolls,” plaintiffs who use their design patents to 
try to strategically capture value in others’ similar designs rather than 
simply preventing knock-off products.276  The rise of patents on individual 
images rather than the shape of an overall product exacerbates this risk.277  
Scholars have debated whether utility patents should have a defense for 
independent invention.278  But even if they shouldn’t, such a defense might 
make sense for design patents, which are closer in purpose to copyright than 
to utility patent.  A design patent shouldn’t inhibit design simply to allow its 
owner to engage in rent seeking; the right’s real purpose is to prevent close 
imitation from destroying the incentives to invest in design.  Requiring 
plaintiffs to prove copying would be consistent with that purpose.  Doing so 
would, however, require Congress to act. 
There may be other ways to narrow the scope of design rights.  The 
current practice of “dotted line” drawings allows patentees to claim a 
particular curve or feature divorced from the product as a whole.279 And the 
use of black-and-white drawings means that designs can infringe even if the 
colors of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s actual products are not particularly 
similar.280 We might instead require the plaintiff to submit a photo or a 
CAD drawing of the actual or intended product.  Doing so would require 
more similarity between the plaintiff’s design and the defendant’s product 
before finding infringement. 
 
D. Raising the Cost of Design Protection 
 
 A different set of solutions to the problem of socially harmful design 
rights involves not weakening those rights but making the screening 
mechanism for design protection more effective.  Doing so would make 
obtaining design rights more costly, and perhaps impossible for some 
claimants.  This might dissuade firms from filing applications for especially 
dubious design patents, reducing the number of low private value/negative 
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social value patents in existence and mitigating the design patent troll 
problem. 
 One way to start is to improve the examination process.  As we have 
seen, design patents are virtually never rejected at the PTO on the merits 
because of similarity to other designs.  While this is not proof that the PTO, 
as currently constituted, is poorly equipped to examine design patents, there 
are reasons to think that the agency is in fact hamstrung.  The PTO likely 
has a very difficult time locating relevant design prior art.  And it rarely 
issues even initial rejections, suggesting that the PTO isn’t simply 
narrowing design patents to appropriate scope before allowing them.  This 
situation might have been tolerable at some point in the past, but even if so, 
it is no longer.  As the scope and power of design patents expand, the PTO’s 
ability to locate prior art needs to expand as well.  We might invest in 
improved search tools designed to find prior art and pay more attention to 
novelty in the examination process.281  Examiners should also properly 
apply the ornamentality and functionality requirements, weeding out claims 
that are not properly the subject of design patent protection at all. 
 Simultaneously, we should increase the cost of seeking or 
maintaining design patent protection.  This would be the most direct way of 
establishing a meaningful costly screen to design patents.282  There is reason 
to be skeptical that an increase in utility patent fees will deter that much 
patent enforcement, because the value of utility patents is highly skewed.283  
But design patents may actually be a better target for cost-based screening, 
both because the value of many designs is lower and because there is not a 
well-established market for the sale of design patents to trolls.  A typical 
utility patent will cost roughly $35,000 to obtain and maintain throughout 
its twenty-year lifetime.284  Perhaps design patents should not cost quite this 
much, but the cost should be higher than the current $5000.285  In particular, 
while owners of utility patents must pay maintenance fees to keep a patent 
in force throughout its lifetime, the PTO imposes no such fees on owners of 
design patents.286  The PTO should consider imposing maintenance fees 
during the later part of a design patent term, just as it does for utility 
patents.  This could prevent opportunistic enforcement while still giving 
design patent owners the ability to prevent rapid copying.287  The PTO 
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charges $12,600 to maintain a utility patent over the course of its full 
twenty-year term.288  Design patents last 75% as long, and so as a rough 
rule of thumb the PTO should consider imposing 75% of that total, or 
$9,000 in design patent maintenance fees.289 
 These two approaches are complementary.  Higher examination fees 
would both increase the potency of design patent’s costly screen and 
provide funding for improved substantive examination—that is, a more 
effective creativity screen.290  Moreover, they would likely do so without 
deterring much (if any) valuable design creation.  This is only one of a 
menu of options that various IP policymakers could pursue.  But for the 
reasons we have detailed, we think it is an especially promising one. 
 We could also increase the cost of enforcing both copyrights and 
design patents.  While litigation is expensive for both plaintiffs and 
defendants, IP owners can often use the threat of litigation to scare parties 
making lawful uses into quitting.  And the existence of contingent-fee 
lawyers means that litigation is often more costly for defendants than for 
plaintiffs.  So we might increase the cost of litigation, for example by 
charging a substantial fee to file an IP infringement suit or perhaps even a 
small fee to send threat letters.  Raising the cost of enforcement rather than 
acquisition would allow us to apply a costly screen to copyright as well as 
design patent law.  And it might have the added benefit of parties to acquire 
design patents cheaply so long as they didn’t use them to threaten others. 
 
E. Optimal Design Screening  
 
 While each of these approaches would help solve the problem, their 
effects are cumulative, and we worry that pulling on too many levers at the 
same time might overshoot the mark.  In this section we discuss how these 
different approaches might overlap. 
 If someone put us in charge of the world,291 our optimal system for 
screening design would look something like this. For purposes of this 
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288 See supra note 203. 
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290 Roger Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827 (2016); Masur, supra note 15, at 699-
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exercise, we will assume that the appropriate term for IP protection is, in 
some cases at least, non-zero and that the current durations for IP rights are 
basically correct. 
 We would start with doctrinal screens as the first-order solution.  
Beginning with copyright law, we would return to a world that resembled 
the one that existed prior to Star Athletica. Copyright law should have 
virtually no creativity threshold and a relatively low ex ante costly screen, 
but it should rigorously police functionality.292 Only those aspects of 
designs that are exclusively non-functional should be accorded copyright 
protection. The Second Circuit’s opinion in Brandir and Judge Kanne’s 
dissenting opinion in Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products293 
come closest to our view of copyright’s optimal functionality screen. 
Design patent law would then serve as the appropriate home for aspects 
of designs that are simultaneously functional and non-functional, but it 
would properly exclude features of designs that were entirely functional 
from both the claim construction and the infringement analysis. As a matter 
of functionality screening, the opinions in Richardson and Apple seem to 
strike the balance correctly. We would, however, impose a much stricter 
creativity threshold on these designs than the PTO and the courts have done. 
Only when a design is truly creative should design patent law accord it 
protection. This would help minimize the number of negative social welfare 
patents.  
In an ideal world we might not need costly screens at all.  As we 
explained above, however, creativity thresholds are imperfect proxies for 
social welfare, and we don’t think courts will get it right all the time.  So it 
makes sense to impose upon design patent claimants a substantially costly 
screen. This includes application and maintenance fees that more closely 
tracked those imposed by utility patent law and perhaps an enforcement fee 
as well.  In addition, in a second-best world we would impose a doctrine of 
election that would prevent claimants from asserting both copyright and 
design patent rights.  That wouldn’t be as much of a problem if we properly 
defined the roles of each, but we still need to prevent inappropriate overlap. 
Establishing a perfect system would require a combination of 
legislative, judicial, and administrative action that we suspect is unlikely to 
occur. But half steps are better than none, and any of the proposals we 
outline in this section is likely to improve social welfare. 
                                                                                                                       
various branches of government in three-year terms. After a round robin miniature golf tournament, 
we have determined that the initial distribution of responsibilities is Executive: Masur, Judiciary: 
Lemley, Legislative: Buccafusco. Eminem will serve as ambassador to the United Nations. 
292 Although copyright law might not want a costly screen for establishing rights for the reasons 
explained by Fagundes & Masur, supra note 15, it should impose increasingly costly maintenance 
fees over its long duration to avoid the problems associated with orphan works. 
293 372 F.3d 913, 932 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The mechanisms IP law has created to separate design protection 
from utility patent protection aren’t working.  Today it is too cheap and too 
easy to get design protection that is too broad.  And because designers don’t 
have to choose between IP regimes but can take advantage of all of them at 
once, the failure of any particular IP regime to get the balance right 
reverberates throughout other doctrines.   
 We suggest several ways to bring design protection back into 
balance.  We can force people to choose only one form of protection for any 
given design element.  We can make it harder to get stronger rights or rights 
that tread on what is properly the ground of utility patent law.  And, finally, 
we can make it more expensive for designers to insulate themselves from 
competition.  Perhaps perversely, one of the ways to encourage good design 
may be to make protecting it more expensive. 
 
